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ARTICLES

STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: WHEN WILL
CONGRESS INTERVENE?
Kathryn L. Moore*

I. INTRODUCTION
Our current system of fiscal federalism grants each of the fifty states plus the
District of Columbia autonomy to design its own taxing system. Although this system
has its advantages, it imposes an extraordinary burden on the interstate taxpayer, and
few outside academia dispute that more uniformity is needed in state and local taxation
of interstate and foreign commerce.'
In theory, uniformity could be achieved in one of three ways: (1) by the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause; (2) by the
voluntary, joint action of the states; or (3) by congressional action. The Supreme
Court, however, has made it clear that it is neither willing nor able to mandate uniformity in state and local taxation.2 Thus, if uniformity is to be achieved, it must be
through the voluntary, joint action of the states or congressional action.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of Law. A.B., University of
Michigan; J.D., Cornell Law School. The author is grateful to Michael Healy, Martin McMahon and
John Rogers for their comments on an earlier draft, to Ron Scott, Sonja Stephenson, Patience
Jazdzewski, Lesley Mentzer, and Carol Parris for their research assistance, and to the University of
Kentucky Summer Research Fellowship Program for its financial support for this article.
1. See infra Section H D.
2. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1978); Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Capitol
Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1950); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305
U.S. 434, 449 (1939) (Black, J., dissenting); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation of Interstate and
Foreign Commerce: The Second Best Solution, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1425 (1996).
3. There is little doubt but that Congress has the power both to expand and to restrict state
power to tax in the affirmative exercise of its Commerce Clause power. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946). See also Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Corporate Income from
Intangibles: Allied-Signal and Beyond, 48 TAX L. REv. 739, 744 n.l 1 (1993). There is some question,
however, whether Congress has the power to authorize state taxation that violates the due process limitations of the fourteenth amendment. Compare Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305, 318
(1992); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 349 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), with William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten
Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1983). Thus, to the extent that uniform legislation
would require that Congress override due process limitations, there may be limitations on Congress'
power. Such limitations, however, should not totally prohibit Congressional legislation providing for
more uniformity in state and local taxation. See also DANIEL SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE
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Over the years, the states have made some limited progress toward voluntary
uniformity.4 In addition, Congress has enacted legislation regulating specific, welldefined aspects of state and local taxation.5 Neither Congress nor the states, however,
have provided for sufficient uniformity in state and local taxation.6
This article examines congressional activity in the state and local tax area to
determine when, if ever, Congress will enact legislation mandating uniformity in state
and local taxation. The article begins by briefly describing our current system of state
and local taxation and explaining why we need more uniformity therein.'
The article then provides an empirical study of congressional activity in the state
and local tax area between January, 1971 and May, 1996.8 Specifically, it focuses first
on four discrete but representative areas in which Congress has enacted legislation
regulating state and local taxation,9 and, second, on four discrete but representative
areas in which Congress has repeatedly introduced bills but has not yet enacted legislation ° to determine when Congress will act in the state and local tax area. The empirical evidence shows that narrow self-interest plays a very important role in determining
when Congress will legislate in this area." It suggests that Congress will legislate in
the state and local tax area if the legislation (1) personally benefits members of Congress; (2) benefits a specific, well-defined interest group that orchestrates an extensive
campaign with limited opposition; or (3) represents a compromise between the states
and taxpayers and is part of a much larger legislative package. 2 The evidence further
indicates that Congress will not enact legislation regulating state and local taxation if
the legislation offers diffuse benefits unless the interested parties are willing and able
to reach a compromise on the subject.' 3
The article then analyzes the empirical evidence in light of the public choice
theory of legislation. 4 That theory, which applies economic theory to analyze the po-

CASE FOR GREATER UNIFORMrrY 108-11 (1993).

In addition, to the extent that such legislation would impose substantial costs on the states, the
legislation would have to comply with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109
Stat. 48 (1995). Because such legislation would create a net gain to the states, the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act should not present an obstacle.
4. For example, in 1958, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, UDITPA. 1 State Tax Guide (CCH)
1 10,000, at 2516 (1996). UDITPA is intended to offer a single, uniform rule for the division of corporate income between the states, and if adopted in its entirety by all states, would ensure that all
corporate income is subject to taxation once, and only once by the states. At present, twenty-one of
the forty-six states and the District of Columbia that impose a corporate income tax have adopted
UDITPA. Id. at 1 10-110. In addition, a number of states have adopted similar taxing structures. Id.
For a general discussion of UDITPA, see Walter Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act: Reflections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the "Throwback"
Rule, 45 U. Ci. L. REv. 768 (1978); Arthur D. Lynn, Jr., The Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act, 19 OHIO ST. LJ. 41 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 979 (1996) (prohibiting states from imposing income
tax on certain "retirement income" of nonresidents), discussed infra in Section I A.
6. See infra Section II D.
7. See infra Section I.
8. See infra Section III.
9. See infra Sections III A-D.
10. See infra Sections III E-H.
11. See infra Section I.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Section IV.
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litical process, predicts that Congress is unlikely ever to enact legislation mandating
,uniformity in state and local taxation. The article shows that the empirical evidence is
fairly, but not completely, consistent with the public choice theory.
Finally, the article concludes by noting that the empirical evidence and the public
choice theory cast doubt on the likelihood of Congress ever enacting legislation mandating uniformity in state and local taxation. The article contends, however, that relational feminist theory offers some hope that such legislation may someday be enacted.15
H. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Our current system of state and local taxation is exceedingly complicated. First,
the mere number of jurisdictions that may impose taxes is almost mind numbing. Not
only may each of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia impose its own set of
taxes, but each of the states may authorize its local governmental units, such as counties, municipalities, townships, and special districts, to assess and collect taxes. In 6fact,
in 1994, more than 6,500 local jurisdictions had the power to impose sales taxes.'
Second, the states may impose a wide variety of taxes and may authorize their
local jurisdictions to impose them. Such taxes include individual income taxes, corporation income taxes, general sales taxes, property taxes, estate taxes, and a wide variety
of excise taxes, such as gasoline taxes, cigarette taxes, and alcoholic beverage taxes.
Each taxing jurisdiction has the power to define independently each tax base and rate
and specify the other rules applicable to each tax.
To illustrate the need for uniformity in state and local taxation, this section
begins by briefly describing our current system of state and local taxation in three
specific areas: (1) individual income taxation; (2) corporate income taxation; and (3)
sales and use taxation. The section concludes by explaining in more detail why we
need more uniformity in state and local taxation.
A. Individual Income Taxation
States have the power to tax the income of individuals under two different theories: (1) the residence-based theory and (2) the source-based theory. Under the residence-based theory, states have the power to tax 100% of the income earned by a
resident. 7 Under the source-based theory, a state has the power to tax the income of
nonresidents if the income is derived from sources within the state.' As a result of
these two overlapping theories, an individual's income may be subject to multiple
taxation if the individual earns income in a state in which the individual does not
reside.

15. See infra Section V.
16.

I ADVISORY

COMMrrrEE

ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

SIGNIFICANT

FEATURES

OF

FISCAL FFDERALISM, Table 27, at 95-96 (1995) [hereinafter FISCAL FEDERALISM]. Indeed, that number
reached a high of almost 9,000 in 1989. Id.
17. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n,
286 U.S. 276 (1932).
18. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37
(1920).
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Although the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Constitution to prohibit
multiple taxation of individual income,'9 the states have voluntarily acted to eliminate
much of the risk of multiple taxation by granting credits against their income taxes for
income taxes paid to other states.2" All of the states with a broad-based personal income tax grant their residents a credit for taxes paid to other states.2 Some states
also grant nonresidents a credit for taxes paid to their home states on income derived
from sources within the state of nonresidence if, but only if, the home state also grants
a similar credit.2 The states, however, do not apply identical rules23 and thus complexities and inequities may result.
The income of professional athletes presents a particularly stark example of the
complexity of and inequities in our current system of state and local taxation of individuals. A professional athlete who resides in one state, plays his home games in another state, and plays away games in still other states may be subject to taxation by
each of these states. The athlete's home state may tax 100% of his income, and each
of the states in which he plays may also tax him on the income earned in that state.
Not only may the athlete be required to file a tax return in each of those states, but the
athlete may be subject to multiple taxation. Although the home state may grant a credit
for taxes paid to other states, it may limit the credit to taxes paid on income earned in
the other states, and each of the states may use a different method to determine how
much income is earned in each state. For example, the home state may use one method
of allocation, such as the duty days method, 4 to determine that the athlete earned x
dollars in State Y. State Y, in contrast, may use a different method of allocation, such
as the games played method,2 to determine that the athlete earned more than x dollars in the State and tax the athlete on that greater amount of income.2 6 The home
state may limit its credit to the tax paid to State Y on x dollars and thus the athlete
may be subject to multiple taxation on the excess income that State Y taxes. If,
however, the states used uniform apportionment and credit rules, the athlete would
only be subject to taxation once on income earned in State Y.'

19. See SaAVIRO, supra note 3, at 21; Walter Hellerstein, Some Reflections on the State Taxation
of a Nonresident's Personal Income, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (1972). See also Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938).
20. See generally, H JEROME R. HELLERSTiN & WALTER HELLERSTEN, STATE TAXATION T 20.10
(2d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter II HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN].
21. All St. Tax Guide (CCH) 1 15-110 (chart) (1996).
22. Id.
23. For example, some states may exempt certain types of income rather than grant a credit for
taxes paid and states may impose ceilings or otherwise limit the credits they grant. See, e.g., KY. REV.
STAT. § 141.070 (Banks-Baldwin 1996) (limiting credit resident allowed to effective Kentucky rate);
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 18001 (West 1994) (limiting credit to resident to foreign taxes paid on
"income derived from sources outside" the state).
24. The duty days method allocates income using a ratio consisting of the number of days an
athlete is present in the taxing jurisdiction to the number of days that the athlete is required to work.
Jeffrey L. Krasney, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Athletes, 47 TAX LAw. 395, 401-02 (1994).
25. The games played method allocates income based on the ratio of games played in a particular
jurisdiction to the total number of games played. Id. at 402-03.
26. Two states using the same method of allocation, but with different specific rules, may reach
similar results. "For instance, a travel day spent partially in two states may result in the allocation of
that day's income to both states, even if the two states employ a duty day allocation formula." Id. at
404 (emphasis added).
27. See generally, Id.; Elizabeth C. Ekmekjian, The Jock Tax: State and Local Income Taxation of
Professional Athletes, 4 SEToN HALL J. OF SPORT LAw 229 (1994).
28. If the home state were to impose a higher tax rate than the rate imposed by State Y, the
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B. Corporation Income Taxes
Much of the complexity in state taxation of corporation income arises from two
factors: (1) the entity subject to corporate income tax varies from state to state; and (2)
the states use different rules to divide corporate income among the states." With respect to the first factor, some states tax each corporate entity separately" while others

permit all members of a "unitary business" to be combined for tax purposes." Moreover, the states do not define the term "unitary business" in a uniform manner 2 and
use a variety of rules to determine when combined reporting may or must be used.33
With respect to the second factor, states typically use two basic methods to determine the amount of income a corporate taxpayer engaged in multistate business has
earned within its borders: (1) specific accounting and (2) formula apportionment.34
Generally, states specifically allocate, that is attribute to one state, income such as

rents and royalties from real and tangible personal property that is relatively easy to
trace to a particular state.3S States then apportion or divide the remainder of the

taxpayer's income on the basis of a ratio of the taxpayer's economic activities or values within the taxing state to the same values or activities outside the state.'

home state might impose a tax on the income earned in State Y equal to the differential in the tax
rates. Technically, however, such taxation would not constitute multiple taxation. It would simply constitute single taxation of that income at the higher rate.
29. Other factors giving rise to complexity include: (1) identifying the potential state tax base; (2)
reporting the tax to each taxing jurisdiction; and (3) submitting to each taxing jurisdiction's audit requirements. See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 34-35.
30. See, e.g., American Bakeries Co. v. Johnson, 131 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1963); Interstate Finance
Corp. v. Dept. Of Taxation, 137 N.W.2d 38 (Wis. -1965); Chesapeake Industries, Inc. v. Comptroller of
the Treasury, 475 A.2d 1224 (Md. 1984).
31. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25104 (West 1992).
32. Criteria used to determine whether the operations of a business are unitary often include: (1)
the percentage of one corporation's stock owned by another corporation; (2) the degree to which centralized services, such as accounting and advertising, are shared; and (3) the type and number of transactions carried on between corporate entities. There are, however, no universally accepted criteria.
Comptroller General Report to the Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means, Key Issues Affecting
State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving 4 (July 1, 1982). In fact, "[t]he
cases are replete with varying attempts by the courts to define 'unitary business' for formulary apportionment purposes." I HELLERS'rEIN & HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION
8.11[l] (2d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter I HaLunsmN & HLaERmaEIN]. For the most recent Supreme Court case grappling with the
issue, see Allied-Signal Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 112 S. Ct. 2251 (1992). See also
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Defining a Unitary Business: An Economist's View, reprinted in ECONOMIC
PERsPECTIVES ON STATE TAXATION OF MuLTuUmsDIcrnoNAL CORPORATIONS 47 (1986).
33. For example, some states authorize combined reporting only if all members of the affiliated
group are taxable in the state. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-442-446 (Michie 1991). Other states
do not impose such conditions. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 63, § 32B (Law. Co-op. 1991). For a
more detailed discussion of the various rules, see I HELLERsTEIN & HEU.ERSTEIN, supra note 32, at
1j 8.12.
34. States may also use a third method, separate accounting, to tax income for particular
industries. I HE.LERSTEIN & HEt.ERsTEiN, supra note 32, at
8.03. Under this method, the in-state
portion of a multistate business is treated as a separate entity doing in-state business, and income for
the hypothetical entity is computed without reference to the receipts or operating expenses of the remainder of the corporation. I State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, H. R. Rep. No. 1480, 88th Cong.
113, 160-61 (1964).
35. Examples of other income that is often specifically allocated include patents and copyright
royalties, dividends and interest, and capital gains and losses.
36. Formula apportionment proceeds from the theory that certain factors or elements fairly reflect
the portion of the measure of the tax allocable to a state. JERoME R. HELLERSTEIN AND WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 418 (5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter
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Although the states generally use the same basic methods for dividing corporate
income among the states, they do not apply identical rules in their application of those
methods. For example, most states apportion income if it is "business income," that is,
"income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's
trade or business,"" and allocate "nonbusiness income," that is, "all income other
than business income."38 The states, however, do not interpret these terms in a uniform manner.39 Likewise, most states use a three factor formula, consisting of property, payroll, and receipts, to allocate business income among the states,' but do not
give the same weight to each factor in the formula4 and do not define all of the factors in the same manner.42 These variations create extraordinary compliance burdens
for the multistate business and create the risk of multiple taxation or undertaxation of
corporate income.43 Were the states to follow uniform rules in identifying the taxpayer subject to tax and dividing corporate income among the states, compliance burdens
would be drastically reduced and the risk of multiple taxation and undertaxation would
be reduced, if not eliminated.
C. Sales and Use Taxation
Most individuals are familiar with the retail sales tax, a tax imposed on the sale
of tangible personal property sold at retail." The retail sales tax is collected by the

HELLERSTN & HELLERSTEIN]. For a more detailed discussion of apportionment formulae, see e.g.,

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 27 TENN. L. REv. 239, 251-57 (1960); Donald K. Barnes, Prerequisites of a Federal Statute Regulating State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REv,
1269, 1276-82 (1960).
37. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § l(a), 7A U.L.A. 336 (1985).
38. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § l(e), 7A U.L.A. 337 (1985).
39. See Harriet Hanlon, Fairness, Simplification, Business Income, Open Meetings Highlighted at
MTC, 11 ST. TAX NOTES 474, 477 (1996) (describing four interpretations of UDITPA's business income definition).
40. UNIF. Div. OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 348 (1985); I State Tax
Guide (CCH) 1 10-110 (1996). Iowa and Nebraska, however, use a one-factor sales/receipts formula.
Id.
41. For example, Tennessee gives equal weight to each factor of the formula while Kentucky
gives twice as much weight to the sales factor as to the property and payroll factors.
42. For example, some states allocate sales to the state of origin while other states allocate sales
to the state of destination.
43. For example, states in which financial institutions are headquartered tend to define the receipts
factor of their apportionment formula to include loans from banks located in the state regardless of
where the borrower is located. Market states, in contrast, tend to define the receipts factor of their apportionment formula to include loans to borrowers located in the state regardless of where the lender
is located. Ranjana G. Madhusudhan, Fiscal Federalism Limits the Bank Tax Uniformity Debate, 5 ST.
TAX NoTEs 460 (1993). If a bank based in a headquarter state were to lend money to a borrower located in a market state and the states were to adopt these divergent rules, the bank could be subject
to multiple taxation on such a loan as both states would attribute the loan to their respective state. In
contrast, if the bank were based in a market state and were to lend money to a borrower located in a
headquarter state, it could escape taxation on such a loan as neither. state would attribute the loan to
their state.
For a more detailed discussion of the inconsistencies in state taxation of the income of
multijurisdictional corporations and the problems raised by these inconsistencies, see Eugene F. Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L.
REV. 423 (1976). See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-280 (1978).
44. For a general discussion of more specific definitions of sales taxes, see HELLERSTEIN &
HE±ERSTEIN, supra note 36, at 660-61. As of November 1994, forty-five states plus the District of
Columbia imposed a state sales tax. FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 8-9. Alaska, Delaware,
Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon did not impose a sales tax. Id.
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seller at the time of the sale and is imposed by the state and local jurisdiction in which
the retail seller is located. Many individuals, however, are less familiar with the use
tax, a tax imposed on "the privilege of using, consuming, distributing or storing tangible personal property after it is brought into [the] State from without [the] State."
The use tax is designed to ensure that residents who purchase goods in or from another
state pay the equivalent of a sales tax on the purchase in their state of residence. 4
Thus, the use tax is generally imposed at the same rate and on the same base as the
sales tax. Hence, a credit is generally granted against the use tax for any sales tax
paid at the time of the sale.'
Theoretically, the sales tax and the use tax are functionally equivalent; that is,
they impose identical burdens on identical transactions.' From the seller's standpoint,
however, the use tax may impose a significantly higher collection burden than the sales
tax. For a local retailer, collecting the sales tax is relatively easy. The sales tax is
simply added to the sales price and collected at the register at the time of the sale.
There should be little confusion regarding the applicable tax rate or tax base49 because
the law of the state and local jurisdiction in which the seller is located determines the
sales tax rate and base, and the seller need only know that law to calculate the sales
0
5

tax.

For a mail order seller, in contrast, collecting the use tax may be much more
onerous. First, the simple mechanics of collecting the tax may be much more burdensome. Unlike the retail buyer, the mail order buyer is not physically present at the time
of the sale. Thus, if the mail order buyer pays for the purchase by check and miscalculates the use tax due, it may cost the seller more to contact the buyer and ask the
buyer to tender the remainder due than the amount of the unpaid tax itself.51 More
importantly, there may be significant confusion regarding the applicable use tax rate
and base. The law of the state and local jurisdiction in which the product is used,
rather than the seller's location, determines the use tax rate and base in a mail order
sale. Thus, the seller must know the law of every state and local jurisdiction to which
it ships goods to calculate the applicable use tax.
Currently 45 states and the District of Columbia, impose sales and compensating
use taxes. 2 The rates range from a low of 3% to a high of 7%, and the bases vary
considerably from state to state. 3 For example, clothing that costs less than $50 is
tax-exempt in Connecticut while Massachusetts exempts clothing that costs less than

45. Woods v. MJ. Kelley, Co., 592 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tenn. 1980).
46. Without the use tax, residents could escape taxation by (1) purchasing goods in neighboring
jurisdictions that did not impose sales taxes or (2) having goods shipped into the state from outside
the state because many such purchases were viewed as immune from sales taxation under the Commerce Clause. HELLERsTEmN & HELLERsTiN, supra, note 36, at 770.
47. See II HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at Im 16.02-16.03.
48. Walter Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAX LAW. 405, 432 (1986).
49. There may be some confusion in determining whether a particular sale is taxable if the sale
involves the rendition of some services in addition to tangible personal property. See generally, II
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 20, at 'Tl12.05-12.07.
50. Interstate Use Tax Collection: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Small Business, 103d
Cong. 50 (1994) (testimony of Rudolph F. Regez, Direct Marketing Association).
51. See, e.g., id. at 51.
52. FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 89-90, Table 31.
53. Id.
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$175 but does not extend its exemption to sports and specialty ware.54 Moreover, well
over 6,000 local jurisdictions have the power to impose such taxes, and their rates
range between .25% and 4.25%."
In a hearing before the Senate Small Business Committee, Rudolph F. Regez,
Vice President and General Counsel of Swiss Colony, a Wisconsin-based mail order
company, described the difficulties these variations can create:
Aunt Millie, who lives in Chicago, decides to send the same Christmas gift package, a box containing cheese and sausage and a Santa Claus Christmas plate, to
each of her two nephews, one in Indianapolis and the other in Cleveland. In Indiana, food is exempt, but Indiana takes the position that the item is a gift and as
such is fully taxable, even if it's a sack of flour. In to any Ohio, [sic] food is also
exempt, but if over one-half of the value the package [sic] is other than food, then
the whole package is taxed. If one-half or more is food, then the whole package is
exempt. The tax rates differ in each one of those states. Aunt Millie is confronted
with a daunting task. After a quick look at the order form, she probably decides not
to buy from our company; maybe this year Christmas cards alone will be sufficient.'
Recognizing the extraordinary burden that the collection of a use tax may impose
on an out-of-state seller, the United States Supreme Court, in National Bellas Hess,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 7 struck down a state statute that imposed use tax collection responsibility on an out-of-state mail order house that had neither outlets nor
sales representatives in the state. Twenty-five years later, in Quill Corp. v. North
8
Dakota,"
the Court reaffirmed the Bellas Hess rule.59 In these cases, the Court did
not strike down the use tax statute itself, but simply relieved certain sellers of the
burden of collecting such taxes. Thus, buyers remain responsible for the payment of
such taxes but sellers may not be required to collect them.
Although buyers remain liable for such taxes even if the seller does not collect
them, buyers frequently do not pay the taxes. Buyers may be unaware of their liability,6' or may simply choose not pay the taxes because of the difficulty and costs states
54. Id. at 89-92.
55. Id. at 97-98.
56. Interstate Use Tax Collection: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Small Business, 103d
Cong. 51 (1994).
57. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
58. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
59. Prior to Quill, there was a debate as to whether Bellas Hess was based on the Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or both. Walter Hellerstein, The Quill Case: What States Can Do to
Undo the Effects of the Decision, 8 ST. TAX NOTs 31-37 (1993); Timothy H. Gillis, Note, Collecting
the Use Tax on Mail-Order Sales, 79 GEO. L. J. 535, 536 n.10 (1991). Accordingly, there was some
question as to whether Congress had the power to overrule the decision. Compare Cohen, supra note
3, at 400 (arguing that Congress has the power to authorize state legislation that would otherwise
violate the due process clause) with ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, 331
(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Far more dismaying, however, is that the Court's reliance on the
Due Process Clause may deprive Congress of the authority necessary to rationalize the joint taxation of
interstate commerce by the 50 States."). In Quill, however, the Court eliminated any uncertainty regarding Congress' ability to overrule the Bellas Hess rule. The Court announced that Bellas Hess had been
based on both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses and overruled the due process holding while
reaffirming the Commerce Clause basis for its decision. In reaffirming the Commerce Clause holding,
the Court expressly noted that Congress had the power to overrule Quill in an affirmative exercise of
its Commerce Clause power. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
60. See, e.g., Interstate Use Tax Collection: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Small Business,
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face in trying to collect the taxes directly from the buyers.6' A study by the United
States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations indicates that as much $3
billion in use taxes may go uncollected each year.62 If there were more uniformity in
state and local use taxation, such as uniform tax bases across the states and uniform
tax rates within each state, requiring out-of-state sellers to collect use taxes would not
be as much of a burden and the current use tax evasion could be reduced, if not eliminated.
D. The Need for Uniformity
Although our current system of state and local taxation has its advantages,63 the
preceding description alone should illustrate why we need more uniformity in state and
local taxation. As one commentator put it, "[the] multitude of tax systems amounts to a
drag on interstate trade almost as debilitating as the border restrictions our federal
system was originally designed to prevent."
More uniformity in state and local taxation would benefit our economy and society at large in a number of ways. First, it would reduce the states' administrative
costs' and taxpayers' compliance costs.' In addition, it would eliminate the risk of

103d Cong. 2-3 (1994) (Florida resident, Joyce Maloney, was unexpectedly faced with a bill for
$226.26 on furniture purchased in North Carolina and delivered to Florida).
61. See id. at 1 ("Most consumers do not know that the [use] tax exists, do not pay it, and there
really is no suitable way to enforce it.") Courier J. (Louisville, KY) OlA (Nov. 17, 1995) (discussing
state's efforts to enforce use taxes); Baton Rouge Advoc. 2G (March 26, 1995) (same); Jon Gworek,
Comment, The Imposition of Use Tax Collection Liability on Mail-Order Retailers: What Happens
When the Bellas Hess Barrier is Removed?, 23 CONN. L. REv. 1087, 1093 (1991) (outlining difficulties in collecting use tax directly from purchaser).
62. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE TAXATON OF INTERSTATE MAIL ORDER SALES: ESTIMATES OF REvENUE POTENTIAL 1990-1992 1 (1992) ("The revenue
potential to states from untaxed interstate mail order sales is estimated to be $2.91 billion in 1990,
with projections of $3.08 billion in 1991 and $3.27 billion in 1992).
63. Daniel Shaviro identifies six principal arguments in favor of state and local government autonomy: (1) autonomy helps ensure that public goods are provided and financed at the most efficient
scale; (2) autonomy promotes tax competition between jurisdictions for residents and business investment; (3) smaller governments are more responsive to voters' preferences than larger governments; (4)
unfettered taxing powers permit state and local governments to exploit and develop their resources
more readily; (5) autonomy has the Madisonian advantage of dividing political authority and thus reducing its ability to do great harm; and (6) autonomy promotes experimentation by governments with
different kinds of tax rules. SHAVRo, supra, note 3, at 78. See also NAT'L CONF. OF STATE TAX
LEGISLATURES, NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASsoC., FNANCING STATE GovENmENr IN THE 1990S 29 (Dec.
1993).
64. Gordon D. Henderson, What We Can Do About What's Wrong With the Tax Law, 49 TAX
NOTES 1349, 1352 (1990).
65. See Leonard Goodman, Conforming Federal and State Individual Income Taxation, 8 ST. TAX
NOTES 2471 (1995) (discussing administrative costs of current system of individual income taxation and
advantages of uniform system); Andrew J. Hoerner, FTA Seeks Uniformity in State Motor Fuel Taxes,
3 ST. TAX NOTES 678, 679 (1992) (states benefit from uniform motor fuel excise taxes because unifortity makes it easier to exchange information and track efforts to evade taxes). See also AICPA,
REPORT ON CORPORATE STATE TAX ADMiNISTRATIVE UNIFORMITY (1995) (discussing need for uniformity in state tax administration and noting advantages it would provide for state tax administrators).
66. See SHAVIRO, supra note 3, at 30-38 (discussing compliance burdens of our current system of
taxation); Leonard Goodman, Conforming Federal and State Individual Income Taxation, 8 ST. TAX
NOTES 2471 (1995) (discussing compliance costs of current system of individual income taxation and
advantages of uniform system); Andrew J. Hoerner, FTA Seeks Uniformity in State Motor Fuel Taxes,
3 ST. TAX NOTES 678, 679 (1992) (truckers want uniform motor fuel excise tax rules and forms because such uniformity would ease their compliance burden); Forum on State Tax Administrative Unifor-
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multiple taxation and undertaxation that exists under our current system of state taxation.67 Moreover, to the extent that taxpayers take state taxes into account in locating
their businesses and planning their affairs,' more uniformity would promote efficiency' and decrease planning costs. ° Finally, more uniformity might decrease litigation and lobbying costs."
Although more uniformity would benefit society at large, it would impose particular costs on particular states and taxpayers.' Our current system enables states to
structure their tax systems so as to shift costs to some extent to out-of-state taxpayers73 and to compete for businesses. 4 In addition, the system permits taxpayers to

mity, 44 TAX ExEcunvE 55, 55 (1991) (noting that current lack of uniform tax administrative rules
imposes substantial compliance costs on taxpayers); Charles B. Bayly, Jr., The Compliance Burden of
State and Local Nonproperty Taxes, in FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS 268 (1968) (describing compliance burdens of non-uniform system of state and local taxation of interstate business);
See also AICPA, REPORT ON CORPORATE STATE TAX ADMNISTRATVE UNORxirrY (1995) (discussing
need for uniformity in state tax administration and noting that such uniformity would ease compliance
burdens on taxpayers).
67. For examples of the risks of multiple taxation and undertaxation under our current system, see
infra Sections II A-C, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 276-81 (1978), and SHAVIRo, supra
note 3, at 21-29. See also Haskell Edelstein, Bank Tax Uniformity Article Criticized, 5 ST. TAX NOTES
704, 704 (1993) (uniformity critical to avoiding serious threat of multiple taxation of income of financial institutions); Ranjana G. Madhusudhan, Fiscal Federalism Limits the Bank Tax Uniformity Debate,
5 ST. TAx NOTES 460, 463 n.49 (1993) ("Nonuniformity increases the potential for tax avoidance and
also multiple taxation for multistate banks"); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOC., FINANCING STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990s 43-45 (1993) (discussing tax evasion possibilities available due to lack of coordination in state tax rules).
68. Compare L. Jay Helms, The Effect of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth: A Time
Series-Cross Section Approach, in THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 574 (1985) (empirical
study showing taxation can significantly affect state's ability to attract, retain, and encourage business
activity) and Leslie E. Papke, Subnational Taxation and Capital Mobility: Estimates of Tax-Price
Elasticities, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 191, 201 (1987) (empirical evidence suggests that "investment location
decisions between states are affected by state and local tax cost differentials") with Larry C. Ledebur
& William W. Hamilton, The Failure of Tax Concessions as Economic Incentives in Reforming State
Tax Systems, in REFORMING STATE TAX SYSTEMs 101, 104 (1986) ("Existing studies, with a striking
degree of consistency, have failed to demonstrate a significant relationship between taxation and location decisions of business firms.").
69. SHAvuRo, supra note 3, at 10-18, 38-41. Cf Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick,
Congress Should End the Economic War Among the States, 10 ST. TAX NOTES 1895, 1897 (1996)
(describing inefficiency that may result from state incentive taxes).
70. To the extent that more uniformity eliminates the taxpayers' ability to structure their activities
to avoid taxation, more uniformity would eliminate the expenses taxpayers incur in planning to avoid
taxation. See generally infra note 76.
71. See SHAVIRO, supra note 3, at 30.
72. More uniformity would also eliminate some of the benefits society at large derives from our
current system of state and local taxation. See generally infra note 63. I believe, however, that these
benefits are outweighed by the costs of our current system discussed above, and thus more uniformity
would be a net benefit to our economy and society at large. See also SHAViRO, supra note 3, at 1838.
73. For example, states may double the weight given to the sales factor of their apportionment
formula to benefit in-state manufacturers at the cost of out-of-state manufacturers. Ryan Simafranca,
The Double-Weighted Sales Formula - A Plague on Interstate Commerce, 9 ST. TAX NOTES 1685,
1685 (1995). See also SHAVIRO, supra note 3, at 20, 29 (describing opportunistic behavior in which
states can engage).
74. See Heather Ann Hope, State Tax System Should be Restructured, Says MTC's Bucks, 93 ST.
TA NOTES 197-10 (Oct. 13, 1993) (Noting that current state tax system "often pits one state against
another in attracting business, and encourages individual states to concoct tax policies to lure companies to do business in their state.") See generally, Graham S. Toft, Doing Battle Over the Incentives
War: Improve Accountability but Avoid Federal Woncompete Mandates', 10 ST. TAX NOTES 1901
(1996); James A. Papke, InterjurisdictionalBusiness Tax-Cost Differentials: Convergence, Divergence,
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arrange their affairs so as to avoid state taxation." More uniformity would limit, if
not eliminate, the opportunity to engage in such behavior76 and thus impose costs on
those states and taxpayers that currently benefit from that behavior.' Moreover, in
some instances, uniform rules would necessarily benefit some states and taxpayers
while imposing costs on others.78
Although more uniformity has its costs, scholars have long recognized its need in
state and local taxation79 and, as our economy has expanded and state and local taxes
have increased in amount and scope," state tax administrators,8 scholars, 2 and tax-

and Significance, 95 ST. TAX NOTES 243-39 (1995); Harley T. Duncan, Interstate Tax Competition:
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 3 ST. TAX NOTES 266 (1992).
75. See also SHAVIRO, supra note 3, at 20, 29 (describing opportunistic behavior in which corporations can engage). Barton Massey, International Firms Wrestle with State Tax Liabilities, Says
KPMG Manager, 11 ST. TAX NOTES 235, 235 (July 22, 1996) ("Corporations play jurisdictional chess
where certain states have more favorable rules than others and tax rates are usually the least important.").
76. Whether such behavior is simply limited or totally eliminated depends on the degree of uniformity achieved. Total uniformity would eliminate the opportunity to engage in such behavior while
partial uniformity, such as uniformity in all substantive and administrative rules other than tax rates,
would permit some degree of tax competition by states and tax avoidance by taxpayers.
77. The extent to which states benefit from interstate tax competition is subject to debate. See,
e.g., DAPHNE A. KENYON & JOHN KINCAiD, COMPEITION AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
EFFICENCY AND EQurrY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1991); ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURISDICTIONAL TAX AND POLICY COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM? (1991).
78. Uniform administrative rules would impose few costs and offer many benefits. See AICPA,
REPORT ON CORPORATE STATE TAX ADMNis'rRATtvE UNIFORMITY 1 (1995) ("With the exception of
changes to penalties and interest rates, administrative uniformity is revenue neutral."). Some, if not all,
uniform substantive rules, on the other hand, would necessarily benefit some taxpayers and states while
disadvantaging others. For example, as discussed infra in note 43, states currently tend to define the
receipts factor of their apportionment formulae as applied to financial institutions in the manner most
advantageous to the state. Thus, headquarter states tend to attribute receipts from loans to the location
of the bank that processed or provided the loan. Market states, in contrast, tend to attribute the receipts from loans to the location of the borrower. Selection of a uniform rule attributing receipts from
loans to the state in which the lender is located would necessarily benefit headquarter states to the
detriment of market states while selection of a uniform rule attributing such receipts to the state in
which the borrower is located would necessarily do the reverse. For a more detailed discussion of
apportionment formulae in general, see infra Section II B.
79. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., Toward Uniformity in Interstate Taxation: A Further Analysis, reprinted in ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON STATE TAXATION OF MULTI- JURISDICTIONAL CORPORATIONS 123 (Tax Analysts 1986); Eugene F. Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 438-39 (1976); Jerome R. Hellerstein, State
Taxation of Interstate Business: The Time Has Come For Uniformity, 16 J. TAX'N 246 (1962); Wagner
& Del Duca, Uniformity or Preferential Tax Immunity, 48 A.B.A. J. 532 (1962); Donald K. Barnes,
Prerequisites of a Federal Statute Regulating State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REV.
1269 (1954-60); Paul F. Mickey & George B. Mickum III, Congressional Regulation of State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, 38 N.C. L. REV. 119 (1960); HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE 275-285 (1953); Jerome R. Hellerstein & Edmund B. Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1941).
80. For statistics on the growth of state and local taxes, see HE ERsTEIN & HELERSTEiN, supra
note 36, at 5, 9. See also Barton Massey, International Firms Wrestle with State Tax Liabilities, Says
KPMG Manager, 11 ST. TAX NOTES 235, 235 (1996) (noting that 50% or more of a company's tax
liability is usually attributable to state taxes).
81. National Conference of State Legislatures, National Governors' Association, Financing State
Government in the 1990s; James W. Wetzler, We Need State Taxes, 7 ST. TAX NOTES 48, 49 (1994)
(James W. Wetzler, Commissioner of New York State's Department of Taxation and Finance, says
"My judgment is that we need greater uniformity than presently exists."). See also News Stories, State
Tax System Should Be Restructured, Says MTC's Bucks, 93 STN 197-10 (Oct. 13, 1993) ("To compete
in the modern world of interstate and international commerce, state governments must work together to
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payers 3 have all become increasingly sensitive to this need. Indeed, a leading state
tax scholar has noted that "the desirability of achieving uniformity in state taxation is
one of the rare matters on which state taxpayers, state tax administrators, and the adjudicative bodies that resolve their disputes can agree."" The following section presents
an empirical study of congressional activity in state and local taxation designed to
determine when, if ever, Congress will enact legislation mandating more uniformity in
state and local taxation.
MU. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY IN THE STATE
AND LOCAL TAX AREA
Congress has introduced bills regulating state and local taxation as far back as
19345 yet did not actually enact any legislation limiting the States' power to tax interstate commerce until 19 5 9 ." This section presents an empirical study of congressional activity in the state and local area to determine when, if ever, Congress will
enact legislation mandating uniformity in state and local taxation. The study focuses on
Congressional activity during the time period of January, 1971 through May, 1996.
I began the empirical research for this section by going through the Congressional Record Index for each year from 1971 through May, 1996 to identify any
bills introduced in Congress to regulate substantively state and local taxation. 7 I
sought bills that focused primarily, or exclusively, on state and local taxation of interstate commerce and disregarded bills that indirectly regulated such taxation, such as by
granting or denying a deduction against federal income tax for state taxes. 8 I found
well over 200 bills that could be divided into 11 different categories: (1) state taxation
of nonresident individuals; (2) state taxation of members of Congress; (3) state taxation
of federal benefits; (4) state taxation of banks; (5) state taxation of pension income; (6)
sales and use taxation; (7) worldwide unitary taxation; (8) severance taxes; (9) property
taxation; (10) Interstate Tax Acts regulating multiple areas of state taxation; and (11)
miscellaneous bills. From these categories, I selected for more in depth study two areas
in which Congress has enacted legislation: (1) state taxation of members of Congress
and (2) state taxation of nonresident pension income, and four areas in which Congress
has repeatedly introduced bills but has not yet enacted legislation: (1) Interstate Tax
Acts regulating multiple areas of state taxation; (2) worldwide unitary taxation; (3)
state taxation of nonresident individuals; and (4) sales and use taxation. To round out

develop uniform tax laws that are both 'equitable and effective,' said Dan Bucks, executive director of
the Multi state Tax Commission.").
82. Alice M. Rivlin, REVIVING THE AMERIcAN DREAM: THE EcONOMY, THE STATEs, AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 126-152 (The Brookings Institute 1992); see generally SHAVIRO, supra note 3.
83. The Office of Tax Policy Research, Working Paper Series, The Income Tax Compliance Cost
of Big Business, Working Paper No. 93-11, at 14 (1993) (state and local income tax reform suggested
most often by survey of large corporations in the United States was "more uniformity between the
state income tax systems and the federal system, and among the state systems.").
84. Walter Hellerstein, Book Review, Federalism in Taxation: The Case for Greater Uniformity, 47
NAT'L TAX J. 225, 225 (1994).
85. S. 2897, 73d Cong. (1934).
86. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555-56 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976)).
87. I looked under the States and Taxation headings in each index.
88. In addition, I disregarded bills that involved federal payments in lieu of state taxes and bills
that regulated the collection of state taxes.
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the study, I selected for further study two additional categories frequently cited in lists
of when Congress has legislated in the state and local tax area: (1) discriminatory state
taxation of interstate transportation; and (2) head taxes on airline passengers. 9
This section begins by discussing in some detail the legislative histories of the
four areas in which Congress has enacted legislation. The section then discusses in
some detail the legislative activity in the four areas in which Congress has repeatedly
introduced new bills but has not yet enacted legislation. Finally, the section concludes
by summarizing the empirical evidence.
A. State Taxation of Nonresident Pension Income
On January 10, 1996, President Clinton signed into law legislation prohibiting
states from imposing income tax on certain "retirement income" of nonresidents. 9°
Although states had long had the power to tax that income under the source tax principle,9' state taxation of nonresident pension income did not receive Congressional
attention until 1988.' That year, Representative Vucanovich and Senator Hecht, both
of Nevada, introduced identical bills in the House and Senate prohibiting state taxation
of nonresident pension income.93 The following year, Representative Vucanovich and
Senator Hecht's replacement, Senator Reid, reintroduced these bills. 94 In addition,
Representative Unsoeld of Washington introduced a similar bill in that session of Congress.95 These first five bills died in committee without a hearing.
Interest in the subject, however, did not wane, and all three bills were reintro-

89. See, e.g., Zain E. Husain, Comment, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California: Does the Application of Worldwide Unitary Taxation to Non-U.S. Parent Corporate Groups Violate the Commerce Clause?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L . L. J. 1475, 1490 n.84 (1995); HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTIN, supra note 36, at 333-34; PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMTATIoNs ON STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION 677 n.l (1981).
90. Act of Jan. 10, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 979 (1996). The Act defines retirement
income to include payments from an array of "tax-qualified" plans (such as 401(k) plans) as well as
certain nonqualified plan payments. See id. at § 1(a). For a general discussion of did Act, see Brian J.
Kopp, New Federal Statute Bars States From Taxing Pension Income of Nonresidents, 6 J.
MULTIsATE TAX'N 68 (1996); Douglas L. Lindholm, Mary B. Hevener, and Carolyn Kelley, State
Source Taxation of Retirement Benefits - What's Barred, What's Left, 84 J. OF TAx'N. 299 (1996).
91. Most states that impose taxes on individual income conform their levies to the federal scheme.
See I All St. Tax Guide (CCH) T1f 15-110 (1996), 10-060 (1996). As a result, most states defer taxation on pension income until it is received. See supra Section U A (states have the power to tax nonresidents on their
pension income under the tax source principle so long as the income was earned in
the state).
92. It is not entirely clear why the issue failed to received national attention until that time. It
may be because it was, as Bill Hoffman claims, the "nation's best kept secret" until he revealed it.
See State Taxation of Nonresidents' Pension Income: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial
and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 41 (1995). [hereinafter 1995
Pension Hearing]. Or, more likely, it may be that prior to the late 1980's few attempts were made to
collect tax on nonresident pension income. See generally, Jean M. Klaiman, Note, Take the Money and
Run: State Source Taxation of Pension Plan Distributions to Nonresidents, 14 VA. TAX REV. 645, 645
(1995) (suggesting that states did not begin taxing nonresident pension income until the late 1980s);
Walter Hellerstein & James Smith, State Taxation of Nonresidents' Pension Income, 92 STN 184-15
(Sept. 22, 1992) ("state taxing authorities generally make no effort to tax the federally deferred gain of
taxpayers who are former, residents at the time of federal recognition").
93. H.R. 5276, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 2820, 100th Cong. (1988).
94. H.R. 1227, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 434, 101st Cong. (1989).
95. H.R. 5811, 101st Cong. (1990). The substance of the three bills was identical. Rep. Unsoeld's
bill only differed in that it included a short title
while the other two did not.
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duced in the following session, the 102d Congress.' In addition, momentum built as
one of the bills, Senator Reid's bill, was considered for the first time at a subcommittee hearing." Both Senators from Nevada 8 and Representative Vucanovich 9 testified in favor of the bill. In addition, two public witnesses testified, one in favor"m
and one against,'' and a representative from the Congressional Research Service advised the Subcommittee that Congress had the power to enact the legislation."° The
Subcommittee received well over a hundred statements and letters on the bill. 3 Only
one statement opposed the bill."
Although none of the three bills were reported out of committee in the 102d
Congress, interest in the issue accelerated in the 103d Congress as Senator Reid'"
and Representatives Vucanovichca and Unsoeld' ° reintroduced bills prohibiting
source taxation of pension income in the 103d Congress." In addition, Representative Stump of Arizona and Representative Franks of Connecticut each introduced bills
on the subject." On July 22, 1993, the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial
Law of the Committee of the Judiciary held a hearing on the five bills." ° Again, the
testimony was predominantly favorable.' The House Judiciary Committee recommended that the House pass an amended version of Representative Vucanovich's
bill." 2 The bill, as amended, passed on the House floor" 3 and was referred to the

96. H.R. 1531, 102d Cong. (1991) (introduced by Rep. Unsoeld); H.R. 431, 102d Cong. (introduced by Rep. Vucanovich); S. 267, 102d Cong. (introduced by Sen. Reid).
97. Senator Reid's bill, S. 267, was one of six "miscellaneous tax bills" considered at that hearing. Miscellaneous Tax Bills-1991: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Miscellaneous Hearing].
98. For Senator Reid's testimony, see id. at 57 and 371. For Senator Bryan's testimony, see id. at
18 and 153.
99. See id. at 19, 380.
100. For testimony by Bill Hoffman, president of RESIST, see id. at 73 and 276.
101. For testimony by Harley Duncan, Executive Director of the Federation of Tax Administrators,
see id. at 75, 263.
102. See id. at 74, 289.
103. See id. at 426-570.
104. James W. Wetzler, New York State Commissioner of Taxation & Finance, submitted a statement opposing the bill. Id. at 517.
105. S. 235, 103d Cong. (1993).
106. H.R. 702, 103d Cong. (1993).
107. H.R. 546, 103d Cong. (1993).
108. These bills differed from the bills introduced in the preceding two Congresses because they
precisely defined pension income for the first time.
109. See H.R. 411, 103d Cong. (1993) (introduced by Rep. Stump); H.R. 2216, 103d Cong. (1993)
(introduced by Sen. Franks). Like the bills introduced in earlier Congresses, these two bills did not define pension income.
110. State Taxation of Nonresidents' Pension Income, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Economic
and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Jud., 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Pension Hearing].
111. Compare id. at 4, 13, 16 (statements of Sen. Reid and Reps. Unsoeld and Vucanovich) with
id. at 21, 43, 62 (statements of three public witnesses: William Hoffman, president, RESIST of America; Joseph Perkins, member and board director, American Association of Retired Persons; and Chris
Farrell, legislative representative, National Association of Retired Federal Employees) with id. at 68-69
(statement of James Smith, professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Professor Smith rejected
the standard objectives given to state taxation of non-resident pension income, but noted that the practical difficulty of such taxation might justify the legislation.) and id. at 56 (statement of Harley
Duncan, Federation of Tax Administrators. Mr. Duncan unequivocally opposed the bill.).
112. H.R. REP. No. 103-776 (1994). The Committee recommended that the bill be amended to define "pension income" more broadly. See id. at 7.
113. 140 CONG. REc. H10,456-59 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994).
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Senate Finance Committee but never made it to the Senate floor." 4
Interest in source taxation of pension income, however, did not die with the 103d
Congress. Instead, early in the 104th Congress, five more bills were introduced on the
subject" 5 and another hearing was held." 6 Opponents appeared to accept legislation
as inevitable and focused on the breadth of the exemption at the hearing." 7 The
House Judiciary Committee again recommended that the House pass an amended version of Representative Vucanovich's bill, " ' and an amended version of the bill was
finally passed by the House" 9 and Senate 2 ° and signed by the President.'
The pension tax legislation owes much to William Hoffman, a persistent and
dedicated advocate from Nevada. Mr. Hoffman was an engineer with Hughes Aircraft
in California until he retired in 1987 and moved to Nevada. As Nevada does not impose an income tax, Mr. Hoffman fully expected to enjoy his retirement years in Nevada free of any state income tax. Unexpectedly, he received a letter from California
demanding that he pay tax on the retirement income he had earned in the state. Unable
to settle the issue with the California Franchise Tax Board, Mr. Hoffman began an active crusade against the tax. In July 1988, he incorporated a grass roots organization,
RESIST (Retirees to Eliminate State Income Source Tax), whose sole purpose was to
eliminate the source tax as applied to retirement income. RESIST first asked the Attorney General of Nevada to challenge California's tax in court. Unable to persuade the
Attorney General to pursue such a challenge, RESIST then began to lobby the Nevada
legislators."l Through RESIST Mr. Hoffman spearheaded a relentless and ultimately
successful public and political campaign against source taxation of pension income.'23
The pension tax legislation also owes much to its unusual political appeal. Individual taxpayers uniformly objected to source taxation of pension income. They
frequently decried it as "taxation without representation,"'24 an anathema in our dem-

114. Senator Reid offered a similar provision that was agreed to as floor amendment No. 1636 to
the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993, S. 540, 103d Cong. (1993). 140 CONG. REC. S4530 (daily
ed. Apr. 20, 1994). But the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993 was put aside in favor of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1994. H.R. 5116, 103d Cong., 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
115. S. 44, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Reid); H.R. 371, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Stump and Rep. Vucanovich); H.R. 394, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep.
Vucanovich, Rep. Ensign, Rep. Stump, Rep. Doolittle, and Rep. Burton); H.R. 744, 104th Cong. (1995)
(introduced by Rep. Pickett); H.R. 1762, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Ensign).
116. 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note 92.
117. See id. at 58 (prepared testimony of Harley T. Duncan, Executive Director Federation of Tax
Administrators); id. at 74 (prepared statement of Gerald H. Goldberg, Executive Director, Cal. Franchise Tax Bd.).
118. H.R. REP. No. 104-389 (1995).
119. 141 CONG. REc. H14,975 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1995).
120. 141 CONG. REc. S19,273 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
121. 142 CONG. REc. D24 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1996).
122. Rep. Vucanovich and Sen. Hecht introduced the first bills on the subject a few months after
RESIST was incorporated. Throughout the hearings, the legislators from Nevada credited Mr. Hoffman
with bringing the subject to their attention. See, e.g., 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note 92, at 13, 29
(testimony of Reps. Vucanovich and Reid); 1993 Pension Hearing, supra note 110, at 9 (testimony of
Sen. Reid); Miscellaneous Hearing, supra note 97, at 19, 57-58 (testimony of Rep. Vucanovich and
Sen. Reid)
123. Mr. Hoffman appeared at each of the three subcommittee hearings held on state taxation of
pension income. See 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note 92, at 38; 1993 Pension Hearing, supra note
110, at 21; Miscellaneous Hearing, supra note 97, at 73-4. At those hearings, he described letters RESIST had received from individuals who had been affected by the tax.
124. See, e.g., 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note 92, at 40 ( testimony of William C. Hoffman);

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 23:171

ocratic society, although dispassionate analysis illustrates that such taxation does not in
fact violate the prohibition against "taxation without representation."'" In addition, a
number of states, especially those that do not impose income taxes, objected to source
taxation of pension income. Although source-based taxation has been a long-embedded
principle of state taxation, it appears that states rarely attempted to collect such taxes
on nonresident pension income prior to the late 1980s. States that do not impose income tax benefitted from that practice as individuals would retire and move to their
states. What was once a tax deferral on pension income became a tax exemption and
made retirement in the state more desirable. Then, in the late 1980s, California and a
few other states began to collect source taxes on pension income. The collection of
those taxes eliminated the benefit the retirees received from retiring to a state with no
income tax, and those states objected to the elimination of that benefit. s Of course,
states that imposed source taxation on pension income objected to the legislation and
argued that they had the power to impose such taxation. 27
B. State Taxation of Income of Members of Congress
In the summer of 1977, Congress enacted Public Law 95-67'" which prohibits
any state or political subdivision, other than the state or political subdivision which a
member of Congress was elected to represent, from treating that member of Congress
as a resident of the state or subdivision for income tax purposes." The statute further prohibits any state or political subdivision, other than the state or political subdivision which a member of Congress was elected to represent, from treating congressional compensation paid to that member as sourced within the state or political
subdivision."3 The effect of the statute is to prohibit Maryland, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia, the jurisdictions in which members of Congress typically reside
while they serve in Congress, from taxing the compensation"' of members of Congress who do not represent their jurisdiction.
At the time that Congress enacted Public Law 95-67, neither Virginia nor the

1993 Pension Hearing, supra note 110, at 242 (statement of Gregory Berry to the Judiciary Committee
Hearing on Source Tax Bills H.R. 546 and H.R. 702.); Miscellaneous Hearing, supra note 97, at 467
(letter from Paul and Sarah Edwards to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee).
125. See 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note 92, at 24 (statement of Professor James C. Smith, citing various Supreme Court decisions, which substantiate the claims that there is no principle more
firmly established than power of sovereign to tax income on the basis of source).
126. The states also objected to the manner in which California imposed the tax. In the 1970's,
California had sent letters to nonresident pensioners advising them that they did not have to pay taxes
on their pension income. Then, in the late 1980's, California began to collect those taxes - retroactively - and imposed penalties and interest for late payment. See 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note
92, at 39 (statement of William C. Hoffman). Needless to say, former California residents found those
taxes highly objectionable, and some states retaliated by prohibiting the use of their courts to collect
those taxes.
127. See, e.g., 1993 Pension Hearing, supra note 110, at 248 (statement of Johan Klehs, Chair
Revenue and Taxation Committee California Assembly).
128. Act of July 19, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-67, 91 Stat. 271 (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 113 (1994)).
129. 4 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (1994).
130. 4 U.S.C. § 113(a)(2) (1994).
131. Of course, under the source tax principle discussed infra in Section H A, these jurisdictions
can tax income earned in the jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if a Senator ran an independent business
in Virginia, in addition to his work as a Senator, Virginia could tax the independent business income.
Cf 123 CONG. REc. 22484, 22486 (daily ed. July 12, 1977).
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District of Columbia taxed the income of members of Congress.' Maryland, however, did. Maryland treated members of Congress who maintained a place of abode in the
state as "residents" of the state for income tax purposes. As those members of Congress who represented states other than Maryland could also be treated as "residents"
of the state which they represented, they were subject to the risk of multiple taxation;
that is, taxation by both Maryland and the state they represented in Congress. Prior to
February 11, 1975, Maryland eliminated that risk of multiple taxation by granting its
residents a credit for income taxes paid to other states. On February 11, 1975, however, Maryland amended its law to provide that that credit could only operate to reduce
state income taxes and could not be applied against local income taxes imposed under
Maryland law. 3 a The effect of the amendment was to subject all individuals, including members of Congress, who could be treated as residents of more than one state to
the risk of multiple taxation.
Within eight months of the amendment, three separate but identical bills were
introduced in Congress to prohibit the practice as applied to members of Congress.'34
Without holding a hearing, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported out one
of the bills, S. 2477, on February 6, 1976,' 3 and shortly thereafter, the Senate passed
that bill." On June 16, 1976, again without holding a hearing, the House Judiciary
Committee favorably reported out that bill with one dissenting vote.'37 The House
then passed the bill'" and presented the bill to President Gerald Ford,'39 who vetoed it in the waning days of his Presidency."4 In the following Congress, an identical bill was introduced,' 4' sailed through Congress,'42 and culminated in Public Law
95-67.
Public Law 95-67 clearly appears to have been driven by self-interest. The statute obviously personally benefitted most members of Congress: 4 it prohibited Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia from taxing their income.'" Maryland's

132. S. REP. 94-631, at 2 (1976) (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-551(C)(S) and
VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.02(e)(1)(i)).
133. S. Bill 23, 1975 Session Laws of Maryland. At that time, neither the District of Columbia
nor Virginia imposed income tax on the congressional compensation of a Member of Congress residing
in the jurisdiction if the Member did not represent the jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 94-631 (1976). See also 123 CONG. REC. 19,522 (1977) (Senator Thurmond notes that "there has been no previous attempt
by a State to tax the income of Members of Congress because of their physical location incident to
service in the Congress.").
134. S. 2447, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced on Oct. 2, 1975); H.R. 8904, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced on July 24, 1975); H.R. 9202, 94th Cong. (1975) (introduced on Aug. 1, 1975).
135. S. Rep. No. 94-631 (1976).
136. 122 CONG. REC. 3488 (1976).
137. S. Rep. No. 94-1271 (1976).
138. 122 CONG. REc. 22,876 (1976).
139. 122 CONG. REc. 23,279 (1976).
140. S. Doc. 94-245, 94th Cong. (1976).
141. H.R. 6893, 95th Cong. (1977).
142. The bill was introduced on May 18, 1977, and the House considered and passed the bill on
June 6, 1977. 123 CONG. REC. 17,493-97 and 17516 (1977). Ten days later, the Senate considered and
passed the bill, with an amendment expressly providing that the bill should apply retroactively. 123
CONG. REc. 19,519-24 (1977). Less than a month later, on July 12, 1977, the House concurred in the
Senate amendment. 123 CONG. Rnc. 22,483-87 (1977). The newly elected President, President Carter,
signed the bill on July 19, 1977. XXXIII Congressional Quarterly 4-C (1977).
143. Of course, it did not prohibit those states from taxing the members of Congress who
represented their state in Congress.
144. A proponent of the bill expressly recognized the legislators' obvious self-interest in the bill
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amendment of its credit provisions affected more than just members of Congress; it
affected all individuals who could be considered residents of more than one state. Yet,
Public Law 95-67 did not address the larger problem of the risk of multiple taxation of
individuals who could be viewed as residents of more than one state. Instead, it simply
eliminated the problem as it applied to members of Congress."5
In debate, a few legislators who might have personally benefitted from the legislation and whose constituency would not have been directly affected by it objected to
it.'" Nevertheless, the primary opponents of the legislation were legislators from
Maryland who did not personally benefit from the legislation and whose constituency
clearly was harmed by it. 47 The bill's proponents claimed that Maryland's taxation
of the Members of Congress' compensation violated the Constitution and that enactment of the bill would avoid "needless litigation."'" That justification, however, appears to be little more than a makeweight argument as Congress clearly could have left
the issue for judicial resolution."
C. State and Local Taxation of Interstate Transportation Carriers
Although almost all State constitutions include provisions mandating uniform or
equal taxes,"5 a comprehensive study completed in 1944 showed that states taxed

when he noted that Maryland's tax policy "could be a very real deterrent to service in the Congress
to those who might seek election as well as to those already elected." 123 CONG. REC. 17,495 (1977)
(Rep. Danielson). See also 122 CONG. REC. 22,873 (1976) (Representative Bauman of Maryland notes
that approximately 100 Members of Congress would personally benefit from legislation.).
145. Moreover, it relieved Members of Congress from states that do not impose an income tax
from having to pay any income tax at all on their income. 123 CONG. REC. 17,496 (1977).
146. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17,497 (1977) (Representative Mazzoli of Kentucky objects to the
legislation because of the appearance of impropriety it creates); 122 CoNG. REc. 22,874 (1976) (Representative McKinney of Connecticut was "frankly amazed" that Congress "even considering an extension of privilege such as that embodied in S. 2447."); 122 CONG. REc. 22,872 (1976) (Representative
Smith of Iowa questioned why the law was limited to Members of Congress when many other individuals faced the risk of multiple taxation); 122 CONG. REC. 22,871 (1976) (Representative Smith of Iowa
"object[ed] to making a special category for Members of Congress when, in fact, double taxation applies to tens of thousands of people in this country."); 122 CONG. REc. 22,870 (1976) (Representative
Kindness of Ohio objecting to creation of a special classification in federal law to override a state
law).
See also S. Doc. No. 94-245 (1976) (In vetoing the bill, President Ford declares, "Since this
bill benefits a narrow and special call of persons it violates, in my view, the basic concept of equity
and fairness by creating a special tax exemption for Members of Congress while other citizens who
are required to take up temporary residence in the Washington area-or elsewhere-do not enjoy a similar
privilege.").
147. Only Representative Sarbanes of Maryland dissented from the House Judiciary Committee's favorable report on S. 2477, see infra note 151, and frequently voiced his objection in debate, see, e.g.,
123 CONG. REc. 19,523 (1977); 122 CONG. REC. 22,871 (1976). Representative Harris of Virginia also
voiced his objection in debate. 122 CONG. REc. 22,871 (1976). See also 123 CONG. REc. 19,523
(1977) (Senator Mathias of Maryland objecting to bill). 122 CONG. REc. 22,874 (1976) (Representative
Gude of Maryland voicing objection); 122 CONG. REc. 22,873 (1976) (Representative Bauman opposes
proposal); 122 CONG. REc. 22,872 (1976) (Representative Spellman of Maryland voicing "strong opposition" to proposal).
148. S. REP. No. 94-631, at 2 (1976); See also 122 CONG. REC. 3488-89 (1976) (statement by
Senator Hruska, an original sponsor of S. 2447).
149. In fact, in vetoing the legislation the preceding year, President Ford declared that "those who
assert that there is a Constitutional infirmity in applying a state income tax to Members while attending Congress may present the issue to the courts for resolution." S. Doc. 94-245, 94th Cong. (1976).
150. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 36, at 46. For a comprehensive discussion of these
provisions, see WADE J. NEWHOUSE, CONsTITUTIONAL UNIFoIrrY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXA-
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interstate transportation carriers more heavily than intercity transportation carriers.'
A comprehensive Senate Report on national transportation policy issued in 1961 found
that the discriminatory taxation continued through that time. Accordingly, the Report
recommended that Congress enact legislation exempting "the right-of-way of railroads
and pipelines from ad valorem property taxation by the States,""' or, in the alternative, enact legislation prohibiting discriminatory state taxation of interstate carriers." 3
Following that Report, numerous bills were introduced in Congress to prohibit discriminatory state taxation of interstate carriers," and the issue was considered at a number of hearings.'55 In some instances, the bills 5 6 and hearings'57 solely addressed
the issue of state taxation. In others, discriminatory state taxation was just one of many
issues addressed.' Finally, in January of 1976, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting discriminatory state and local taxation of rail carriers as part of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act). 59 The prohibition was

TION (2d ed. 1984).

Two provisions of the U.S. Constitution also prohibit discriminatory state taxation. First, the
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, has been interpreted to prohibit discriminatory state
taxation of interstate commerce. See generally, Moore, supra note 2; Ferdinand P. Schoettle, Commerce
Clause Challenges to State Taxes, 75 MINN. L. REV. 907 (1991); Philip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca
Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39
VAND. L. REV. 879 (1986). Second, the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, prohibits discriminatory state taxation. See generally, I HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEiN, supra note 32, Ch.
3. These provisions, however, did little to prohibit discriminatory state taxation of interstate carriers.
First, until 1977, taxes on interstate transportation carriers generally were not viewed as taxes on interstate commerce, and thus the dormant Commerce Clause was not interpreted to apply to such taxes.
Id. at 4-48. Second, the Equal Protection Clause has generally been interpreted to accord states a great
deal more deference in classifying taxpayers. See, e.g., Lehnausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356 (1973). See also I HELLRSEI & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 3-2-3-3.
151. See S. REP. NO. 445, at 449. (1961) (discussing the "Report on Carrier Taxation" transmitted
by the Board of Investigation and Research").
152. Id. at 463.
153. Id at 465. This alternative proposal also included a recommendation that Congress provide
common carriers with a federal remedy against such discrimination. Id. at 466.
154. The court in Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 552 F. Supp. 1031, 1036
n.8 (1982), identified nine such bills introduced prior to the start of this study: H.R. 16245, 91st
Cong. (1970); S. 2289, 91st Cong. (1969); S. 927, 90th Cong. (1968); H.R. 1480, 90th Cong. (1967);
S. 2988, 89th Cong. (1966); H.R. 4972, 89th Cong. (1965); H.R. 736, 88th Cong. (1963); H.R. 7497,
87th Cong. (1961); and H.R. 7421, 87th Cong. (1961). In addition, the court identified three bills included within the time frame of this study: S. 1891, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 3945, 92d Cong. (1972); S.
2841, 92d Cong. (1971). Id.
155. See, e.g., Surface Transportation Legislation: Hearings before the Subcomm. On Surface
Transportation of the Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 169-170, 175, 182 , 203-228, 279-305, 312-326
(1971 and 1972); Common and Contract Carrier State Property Tax Discrimination: Hearings before
the Subcomm. On Transportation and Aeronautics of the Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Comm.,
91st Cong. (1970).
156. See, e.g., S. 1891, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 3945, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 2841, 92d Cong. (1971)
(state taxation was one of two issues addressed in bill).
157. See, e.g., Common and Contract Carrier State Property Tax Discrimination: Hearings before
the Subcomm. On Transportation and Aeronautics of the Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Comm.,
91st Cong. (1970).
158. See, e.g., I Surface Transp. Legislation: Hearings on S. 2362, S. 1092, S. 1914, S. 2635, S.
2841, S. 2842, and S. Con. Res. 56 Before the Subcomm. On Surface Transportation of the Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong. 169-170, 175-76, 182 , 203-216, 219-228, 279-304, 312-319, 323-324 (19711972 [hereinafter 1971-1972 Surface Transp. Hearings]); S. 2718, 94th Cong. (1975); S. 2362, 92d
Cong. (1971).
159. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90
Stat. 31, 54-55 (current amended version at 49 U.S.C. § 11501 (Supp. I 1996)). Two years later the
Act of Oct 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978) (revision of subtitle IV of title 49 of
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a small part of the 4-R Act's comprehensive reform and its lengthy reports paid scant
attention to the issue of state taxation."W
Congress extended the 4-R Act's prohibition against discriminatory state taxation
to motor carriers in section 31 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.61 Like the 4R Act,
the Motor Carrier Act was an extensive Act of which the prohibition against discriminatory state taxation was a minute part that received little attention. 62 The Motor
Carrier Act limited its protection against discriminatory state taxation to motor carrers
of property. That protection was extended to motor carriers of passengers in the Bus
Regulatory Reform Act of 1982.63 Again, the extension was a small part of much
more comprehensive reform."
In 1982, Congress extended the protection against prohibitory state taxation to air
carriers in Title V of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 19 8 2." Again,
the provision was a small part of much larger legislation, and it received little notice.

the United States Code), recodified the 4-R Act. The prohibition on discriminatory state taxation was
moved, and its language was modified slightly, but the recodification was not intended to change the
law substantively. Section 3(a), 92 StaL at 1466; H.R. Rep. No. 95-1395, at 178-79 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3009, 3187. The provision was again moved, without substantive change, in
1995. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 102(a), 11501, 109 Stat. 803, 843 (1995).
160. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-595, at 165-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 148, 180-81;
S. Rep. No. 94-499, at 65-66 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 14, 79-80; H.R. Rep. No. 94725, at 76-78, 113, 168-170, 252-253 (1975).
161. Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 31, 94 Stat. 793, 823-24 (current version
at 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (Supp I. 1996)). The provision was moved, without substantive change, in accordance with the ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 103, 14502, 109 Stat. 900-901
(1995).
162. The hearings on the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 numbered more Ihan 3,600 pages and filled
three separate volumes; for the few occasions on which the prohibition against discriminatory state taxation was mentioned, see 1 Examining the Current Conditions in the Trucking Indus. and the Possible
Necessity for Change in the Manner and Scope of its Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Surface Transp. of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 96th Cong. 361, 518 (1979); 2
Examining the Current Conditions in the Trucking Indus. and the Possible Necessity for Change in the
Manner and Scope of its Regulations: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the
Comm. on Public Works and Transp. and the Comm. on Commerce, 96th Cong. 19, 236 (1979); 3 Examining Current Conditions in the Trucking Indus. and the Possible Necessity for Change in the Manner and Scope of its Regulations: Hearings on H.R. 6418, H.R. 753, H.R. 2777, HR. 3925, H.R.
4505, H.R. 4525, HR.4545, H.R. 4549, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4563, H.R. 4586, H.R. 4675, H.R. 4697,
HR.4971, H.R. 5088, S. 1390, S. 1798, and S. 2245 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the
House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 96th Cong., 286-87 (1980).
163. Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, § 20, 96 Stat. 1102, 1122 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 14502 (Supp. 1 1996)).
164. The Senate and House Conference Reports say little about the provision prohibiting discriminatory state taxation. S. Rep. No. 97-411, at 30-31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2308,
2337-2338; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-780, at 55 (1982), 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2342, 2366. Similarly, little
attention was devoted to the subject in hearings. For rare references to the issue, see Deregulation of
the Intercity Bus Industry: Hearing on H.R. 3663 Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 97th Cong. 218 (1982); Bus Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 97th
Cong. 160, 191, 194-95, 203, 455 (1981).
.165. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 532(b), 96 Stat.
324, 701-702 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d), recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d)). The state
taxation provision was moved in accordance with the Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. no. 103-272, §
1(e), 40116(d), 108 Stat. 745, 1112 (revision of title 49 of the United States Code).
166. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) was a major piece of legislation
containing six separate titles. Title V of the Act was entitled the Airport and Airway Improvement.
The state tax provision was a small part of the title that received little attention. S. Rep. No. 97-494,
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Not surprisingly, to the extent that the issue was raised at hearings, the states
expressed opposition to the provisions prohibiting discrimination in state taxation of
interstate commerce'6"7 while representatives of interstate carriers supported them."
The states generally conceded that there had been discrimination against interstate
carriers in the past but contended that they had eliminated, or were in the process of
eliminating, such discrimination, and there was no need for federal intervention. In
addition, the states were concerned that the bills unnecessarily restricted their powers." The carriers, in contrast, argued that the legislation was necessary since discrimination remained a problem, and under the current system, challenging a tax could
be more expensive 7than
the tax itself. The carriers contended that they only sought
0
equity and fairness.1

D. State and Local Head Taxes on Air Passengers
Prior to 1972, few states or local jurisdictions imposed head taxes 7' on individuals travelling by air, and there was serious doubt as to the constitutionality of such
taxes." In 1972, however, the Supreme Court held that such taxes do not violate the
Constitution so long as they are based on a fair approximation of the use of state-provided facilities for whose benefit they are imposed and they are "neither discriminatory
against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison to the governmental benefit
conferred.'
In upholding the taxes, the Court found that not only did no federal
statute expressly preempt the taxes, but they were
consistent with the purpose of the
74
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970.1
Less than a month after the Court issued its decision,'" three bills were introduced in the House and Senate to overrule legislatively that decision.176 Less than a

at 37 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. 781, 1188; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-760, at 722 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1190, 1484.
167. See, e.g., 1971-1972 Surface Transp. Hearings, supra note 158, at 203. Common and Contract
Carrier State Property Tax Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 16245, H.R. 16251, H.R. 16316, H.R.
16357, H.R. 16411, H.R. 16639, and S. 2289 Before the Subcommittee on Transp. and Aeronautics of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 89, 95, 119, 130, 143 (1970)
[hereinafter 1970 Carrier Hearing].
168. See, e.g., 1970 Carrier Hearing, supra note 167, at 9, 12-13, 131, 141-143.
169. See, e.g., id. at 95; 1971-1972 Surface Hearings, supra note 158, at 203.
170. See, e.g., 1970 Carrier Hearing, supra note 167, at 16. For a more detailed discussion of the
substance and judicial interpretations of these statutes, see Scott M. Schoenwald, Note, Discriminatory
Demands and Divided Decisions: State and Local Taxation of Rail, Motor, and Air Carrier Property,
39 VAND. L. REV. 1107 (1986).
171. Head taxes refers to taxes, fees, or charges imposed on passengers or on the carriage of passengers.
172. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (holding unconstitutional a head tax on
rail passengers); Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 463 P.2d 470 (Mont. 1970)
(holding unconstitutional a head tax on airline passengers); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 264 A.2d
268 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970) (holding unconstitutional a head tax on airline passengers).
173. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716-17
(1972).
174. Id. at 721. Nevertheless, in concluding its opinion, the Court expressly invited Congress to
overrule legislatively its decision. Id. at 722.
175. Evansville-Vanderburgh was decided on April 19, 1972. Id. at 707.
176. S. 3611, 92d Cong. (1972) (introduced May 16, 1972); H.R. 14847, 92d Cong. (1972) (introduced May 9, 1972); H.R. 14991, 92d Cong. (1972) (introduced May 16, 1972).
In addition, a similar bill was pending in Congress at the time the Court decided EvansvilleVanderburgh. H.R. 2337, 92d Cong. (1971) (introduced on January 26, 1971).
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month after that,'" a Senate Subcommittee held a hearing on the Senate bill to prohibit state and local head taxes on air travellers. The hearing was part of a more comprehensive set of hearings begun earlier that year on bills to amend the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 1970 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.17 A week
after the Senate Subcommittee hearings were concluded, 79 a House Subcommittee
began similar hearings."
The proposed federal statutory preemption of state and local head taxes on airline
passengers was heatedly debated.'' Witnesses representing state and local jurisdictions and airports, which would receive the revenue from such taxes, strongly opposed
such preemption 82 while witnesses representing travellers, who would have to pay
the taxes, and airlines, whose business could be adversely affected by the taxes,
strongly supported federal preemption.'83 Even federal administrative agencies could
not agree on the proper approach. The Department of Transportation initially opposed
any federal statutory preemption'84 while the Civil Aeronautics Board advocated a
twelve to eighteen month federal moratorium on state and local head taxes to afford
the Board an opportunity to study the subject. 85
Despite the conflicting views presented at the hearings, the vast majority of Senators appeared throughout the hearings to strongly support legislation prohibiting state
and local head taxes.' Their support may be attributable to the fact that Senators are
frequent fliers and thus personally benefit from a prohibition of state and local head
taxes.8 7 Their support, however, is more likely attributable to the fact that they

177. June 12, 1972.
178. Amend the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 and the Federal Aviation Act of
1958: Hearings on S. 2397, S. 3302, S. 3611, and S. 3755 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. (1972) [hereinafter Senate Aviation Hearings].
179. June 19, 1972.
180. Air Passenger Fees-State and Local Charges: Hearings on H.R. 2337, H.R. 14847, and H.R.
10326 Before the Subcomm. On Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong. (1972) [hereinafter House Aeronautics Hearings].
181. See, e.g., id. at 1 ("Judging from the recent hearings on the Senate side, this matter is quite
controversial.").
182. See, e.g., Senate Aviation Hearings, supra note 178, at 145, 151, 179 (testimony by Thomas
J. Bliley, representing National League of Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors; Donald Reilly, Executive Vice President Airport Operators Council International, John Nammack, representing National Association of State Aviation Officials); House Aeronautics Hearings, supra note 180, at 115, 133
(testimony of George Bean, representing American Assoc. of Airport Executives; Lennox Moak representing City of Philadelphia).
183. See, e.g., Senate Aviation Hearings, supra note 178, at 161, 163, 176, 189 (statement of Edward Driscoll, president of National Air Carrier Association; statement of Stuart Tipton, president of
Air Transport Association of America; statement of Richard Sorlien, vice president of Altair Airlines,
Inc.; statement of Thomas Miles, president of National Air Transportation Conferences); House Aeronautics Hearings, supra note 180, at 82, 152, 163 (statement of Edward Driscoll, president of National
Air Carrier Association; statement of James Dunne, managing director of Airline Passengers Association
Inc.; statement of Tristram Colket, Jr., president of Altair Airlines, Inc.).
184. Senate Aviation Hearings, supra note 178, at 140-41; House Aeronautics Hearings, supra note
180, at 34.
185. Senate Aviation Hearings, supra note 178, at 138; House Aeronautics Hearings, supra note
180, at 53.
186. Senate Aviation Hearings, supra note 178 passim.
187. Cf. Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 4082, H.R. 2695, H.R.
4213, H.R. 4214, H.R. 4182, and S. 38 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Aeronautics of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. 107 (1973) (Rep. Skubitz asserts that
"[tihe best way to get rid of the head tax is to send the Members of Congress through Philadelphia
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thought that Congress intended the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to
preempt such taxes despite the Supreme Court's finding to the contrary.
In the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Congress committed the
federal government to expanding and improving the nation's air transportation
system.1ss Concomitant with that Act, Congress created the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund to provide federal funds for local airport expansion and improvement projects. 9 As originally enacted, the Trust Fund was supported by several federal aviation taxes, including an 8% tax on domestic airline tickets, a $3 head tax on international flights out of the United States, and 5% tax on air freight.' 9 Throughout the
Senate hearings, the Senators consistently expressed their belief that Congress intended
the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to preempt state and local head
taxes on airline passengers.' 9 ' Even proponents of head taxes conceded that the
Court's conclusion that the 1970 Act did not preempt state and local head taxes may
have been contrary to expectations.'" Moreover, in the Senate Report issued following the hearings, the Senate Committee declared, "This committee never intended that
air travellers
would be subject to state and local head taxes as well as the national user
193
charges."'
The Representatives seemed less certain that Congress intended to preempt state
and local head taxes in the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970. None of the
Representatives expressly discussed the subject in the House hearings, and the House
Report simply stated that state and local head taxes were "not considered in the congressional action which led to the Airport and Airway Development Act."'94 Nevertheless, the Representatives, like the Senators, seemed consistently opposed to state and
local head taxes. 95 Unlike the Senators, however, the Representatives seemed more
willing to consider alternatives to federal preemption, such as a moratorium on or federal regulation of such taxes." 9

and compel the payment only once," and Stuart Tipton, representing Air Transport Association of
America, responds that he thinks that "a great many of them have.").
188. Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Star. 219 §§ 2-3 (1970).
189. Id. at § 208.

190. Id. at §§ 203-04.
191. See, e.g., Senate Aviation Hearings, supra note 178, at 51, 52, 98 (Sen. Cook stated that "I
don't think that there was anything other than an absolute understanding that on a 50-50 basis we
were imposing taxes to preempt, and we now find that we don't preempt."; Sen. Tipton stated that
"[t]his committee and the Congress reached a conclusion that a tax on passengers was justified at the
national level, and levied a heavy one . . . ." Sen. Cannon stated that "Despite what the Supreme
Court said, I am sure it was the intention of this committee that we preempt the field .... ).
192. Id. at 122, 131 (Stuart Paine, vice chairman of the Louisville and Jefferson County Air Board
stated "I think that the possibility of head taxes makes this-an entirely new ballgame because, quite
frankly, I think that the aviation facilities of this country can expand at a much more rapid rate than
we were thinking in terms of a week before Thursday." After quoting the Court, Sen. Cotton from
N.H. declares, "[t]he point is ... that while we may not have anticipated the result which we now
are confronted with ....").
193. S. REP. No. 92-1005, at 23 (1972).
194. H. REP. No. 92-1279, at 3 (1972). In a report issued the following Congress, however, the
House declared, "Congress never intended for local and State agencies to raise money for airports by
the use of such [head] taxes." H. REP. No. 93-157, at 4 (1973).
195. House Aeronautics Hearings, supra note 180 passim. Howard Trockman, attorney for Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District, argued that the Representatives endorsed the preemption
legislation "because of the support, recommendation, and lobbying of the airline industry." Id. at 195.
196. See, e.g., id. at 58, 76, 101.
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Following the Senate hearings, the Senate Commerce Committee reported out a
bill " which prohibited states and local jurisdictions from imposing a head tax on air
travellers and amended the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to increase
the federal share of funding for airport development throughout the country.'" Following the House hearings, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
favorably reported out a bill'" that imposed a eighteen month moratorium on state
and local head taxes.2' ° Ultimately, the House2 °' and Senate"°c agreed to and
passed an amended version of the Senate bill that prohibited state and local head taxes
and amended the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to increase the federal
share of funding for airport projects. President Nixon pocket-vetoed the bill, but his
veto message indicated that the veto was based on the bill's increase in federal funding, not its prohibition of state and local head taxes."'
Early in the 93d Congress, bills were again introduced to prohibit state and local
head taxes on air passengers,' ° and a House Subcommittee held hearings on the subject.' Much of the testimony in the hearings was similar to that in the 92d Congress; although, some of the opposition to the prohibition softened in the later hearings.' The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce then favorably

197. S. 3755, 92d Cong. (1972).
198. S. REP. No. 92-1005 (1972).
199. H.R. 14847, 92d Cong. (1972).
200. H. REP. No. 92-1279, at 3 (1972). Originally, H.R. 14847: (1) amended the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 1970 to increase the federal share of funding for airport development
throughout the United States; and (2) totally prohibited state and local head taxes on air travellers. The
House subcommittee unanimously recommended that the bill be amended to delete the amendment to
the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 and impose a moratorium on state and local head
taxes rather than absolutely prohibiting them. Id.
201. 118 CONG. REC. 35,116 (1972).
202. 118 CONG. REc. 35,862 (1972).
203. 118 CONG. REc. 37,203 (1972). The President's veto message states, "[tihis bill would increase Federal expenditures and raise percentage participation in categorical grant programs with specific and limited purposes. I believe this would be inconsistent with sound fiscal policy. Airport development funds have been almost quadrupled since 1970 under this administration." Id.
204. S. 38, 93d Cong. (1973) (introduced on Feb. 6, 1973); H.R. 627, 93d Cong. (1973) (introduced on Jan. 3, 1973); H.R. 1784, 93d Cong. (1973) (introduced on Jan. 11, 1973); H.R. 2695, 93d
Cong. (1973) (introduced on Jan. 23, 1973); H.R. 4082, 93d Cong. (1973) (introduced on Feb. 7,
1973); H.R. 4182, 93d Cong. (1973) (introduced on Feb. 8, 1973); H.R. 4214, 93d Cong. (1973) (introduced on Feb. 8, 1973).
Like S. 3755, these bills also contained provisions to amend the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to increase the federal share of funding for airport projects. In addition, H.R. 627
included a provision for the establishment of a Federal air transportation security force. A separate bill
was also introduced to impose an eighteen month moratorium on state and local head taxes. H.R.
4213, 93d Cong. (1973).
205. Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973: Hearings on H.R. 4082, H.R. 2695, H.R. 4213,
HY. 4214, H.R. 4182, and S. 38 Before the Subcomm. on Transp. and Aeronautics of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong. (1973). The sole Senate bill introduced on the
subject was also considered at these hearings.
206. See, e.g., id. at 115, 155-56, 254 (J. Donald Reilly, executive vice-president of Airport Operators Council International: AOCI would support the total legislation package, including the prohibition
on head taxes, if the House otherwise approves an amendment to increase federal share in ADAP
program; Arthur Fallon, president-elect to Am. Ass'n of Airport Executives: Not willing to fight too
hard on head tax issue if federal share in ADAP program increased; John Nammack, executive vicepresident Nat'l Ass'n of State Aviation Officials: "We make a gesture in favor of opposing prohibition
of the head tax, although frankly we are not going to make an issue of it and have no intention of
making an issue of it.").
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reported out a bill 7 that was essentially the same as the bill which the Senate and
House had agreed to the previous year.2' Although the Senate did not hold any hearings," it favorably reported out of committee a bill"' that was substantially similar
to the bill passed by the House and Senate the preceding year. " The Senate passed
its bill," 2 and following a joint conference,213 the House2"' and Senate" ' agreed
to an amended version of the Senate bill.21 6 The President approved the amended bill
on June 18, 1973.2"7
Both the House and Senate Reports make it clear that the federal prohibition of
state and local head taxes constitutes a federal preemption of the field. Congress wanted to ensure that there was a single, uniform, national tax on the carriage of persons in
air transportation." ' In 1990, Congress amended the prohibition against state and local head taxes to authorize airport authorities to collect head taxes on departing passengers under certain circumstances." 9 Extensive federal regulations now govern the collection and use of these taxes.20
E. Interstate Tax Acts
Between 1971 and 1982, nineteen bills were introduced in Congress to regulate
multiple areas of state taxation." The vast majority of the bills were to be cited as

207. H.R. 6388, 93d Cong. (1973).
208. 119 CONG. REc. 13,910 (1973). The only major difference related to the portion of the bill
concerning federal funding of airport projects. The bill also extended an exemption for certain airports
imposing a head tax.
209. The Senate Report declared that hearings were unnecessary "because the issues were thoroughly discussed and considered in hearings and executive meetings of the [Senate Commerce] Committee
during the 92d Congress," S. REP. No. 93-12 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1434, 1437.
210. S. 38, 93d Cong. (1973).
211. S. REP. NO. 93-12 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1434, 1436.
212. 119 CONG. REc. 3360 (1973).
213. See H.R. REP. No. 93-225 (1973).
214. 119 CONG. REc. 17,345 (1973).
215. 119 CONG. REc. 18,047 (1973).
216. The Senate bill contained two exemptions from its prohibition against head taxes. First, any
state which levied such taxes before May 21, 1970 was exempted from the prohibition until July 1,
1973. Second, certain airport authorities were also exempted until July 1, 1973. The House extended
the exemption until December 31, 1973 and only applied the exemption to jurisdictions which levied
and collected, not just levied those charges. The compromise bill extended the exemption until December 31, 1973 to jurisdictions which levied the charges. The compromise bill also contained some
compromises with respect to the federal funding portion of the bill.
217. 119 CONG. REc. 20,380 (1973).
218. S. REP. No. 93-12, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1434, 1435 ("This prohibition
will ensure that passengers and air carriers will be taxed at a uniform rate--by the United States--and
that local 'head' taxes will not be permitted to inhibit the flow of interstate commerce and the growth
and development of air transportation."). H.R. REP. No. 93-157, at 3 (1973) ("This prohibition will
ensure that passengers and air carriers will be taxed at a uniform rate by the Federal Government, and
will not be subject to the various user taxes being levied in a number of jurisdictions across the country.").
219. Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. IX, §§ 9110, 9125,
104 Stat. 1388-357, 1388-370 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. 1993)), recodified by Pub. L.
No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1377 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40117 (1994)).
220. 14 C.F.R. 158 (1995). For a more detailed discussion of these charges, see Suzanne Imes,
Comment, Airline Passenger Facility Charges: What Do They Mean for an Ailing Industry?, 60 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 1039 (1995).
221. H.R. 6402, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 5, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 8277, 96th Cong. (1980); S.
983, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 669, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 2173, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 9, 94th
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the "Interstate Taxation Act '" and contained provisions regulating state corporate
income, gross receipts, and sales and use taxation. In addition, a number of the bills
contained other provisions, such as provisions regulating state income taxation of individuals' and provisions extending the jurisdiction of federal courts to cover state tax
matters arising under the Act." 4
Each of the bills set forth uniform jurisdictional standards; that is, uniform limits
on when states could tax the income or gross receipts of businesses engaged in interstate commerce and when states could impose use tax collection responsibility on
multijurisdictional sellers.2' In addition, each of the bills limited the percentage of
multistate business income or capital that states could tax.226 The bills, however, provided limited uniformity in substantive tax rules.2" For example, the bills did not
contain uniform use tax bases, nor did they provide for mandatory uniform allocation
formulae for the division of corporate income among the states.2" Thus, the bills did
not resolve many of the problems created by the lack of uniformity in the states' substantive tax rules. 9
Three separate hearings were held on four of the bills,23 but none of the bills

Cong. (1975); S. 2080, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 977, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 1245, 93d Cong. (1973);
S. 2092, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 1962, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1538, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 2536, 92d
Cong. (1971); H.R. 4770. 92d Cong. (1971); S. 317, 92d Cong. (1971); S. 1883, 92d Cong. (1971); S.
3333, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 4080, 92d Cong. (1972).
222. All but five of the bills were to be cited as the "Interstate Taxation Act." One was to be cited as the State Taxation of Multistate Taxpayers Act. S. 1962, 93d Cong. (1973). The other four bills
were untitled: S. 2173, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 2092, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 3333, 92d Cong. (1972); S.
4080, 92d Cong. (1972).
223. See, e.g., H.R. 6402, 97th Cong. § 501 (1982); H.R. 5, 96th Cong. § 501 (1979); H.R. 9,
94th Cong. § 501 (1975).
224. See, e.g., H.R. 8277, 96th Cong. § 401 (1980); S. 1245, 93d Cong. § 401 (1973).
225. See, e.g., H.R. 6402, 97th Cong. § 101 (1982); H. R. 8277, 96th Cong. §§ 101, 201 (1980);
H.R. 669, 95th Cong. § 101 (1977); S. 2080, 94th Cong. §§ 101, 201 (1975); H.R. 977, 93d Cong.
§ 101 (1973); S. 317, 92d Cong. § 101 (1971).
226. See, e.g., H.R. 6402, 97th Cong. § 201 (1982); H. R. 8277, 96th Cong. § 301 (1980); H.R.
669, 95th Cong. § 201 (1977); S. 2080, 94th Cong. § 259 (1975); H.R. 977, 93d Cong. § 201
(1973); S. 317, 92d Cong. § 201 (1971). The bills also contained other provisions too numerous to
mention.
227. Interstate Taxation, S.2173: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
426 (1977) [hereinafter S. 2173 Hearing] (James Polk, Levi, Strauss and Company, argues that there is
a need for standardization in both substantive tax rules and jurisdictional rules and notes that S. 2173
goes a long way with respect to the former of these two interests).
228. Each of the bills set forth an optional two- or three-factor formula for dividing corporate income among the states. The bills did not mandate that the states use that formula but simply prohibited states from taxing more than would be taxed under use of that optional formula. See generally
supra note 226.
229. In apparent recognition of the bills' limitations, many of the bills contained a provision mandating that congressional committees evaluate the states' progress toward resolving the problems arising
from state taxation and propose additional legislation if substantial progress had not been made within
four years of the enactment of the Act. See, e.g., H.R. 6402 § 401, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 5, 96th
Cong. (1979); H.R. 9 § 401, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 669 § 401, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 2092 § 524,
93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 977 § 401, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 3333 § 524, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 317
§ 401, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 1538 § 401, 92d Cong. (1971).
230. State Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong.
(1980) (hearing on S. 983, 96th Cong. (1979) and S. 1688, 96th Cong. (1979) (dealing solely with
corporate income taxation)) [hereinafter 1980 Worldwide Hearing]; S. 2173, 95th Cong. (1977); State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings before the Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong. (1973) (hearing on S. 1245, 93d Cong. (1973), S.
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was reported out of committee. The failure of the bills to progress beyond committee

is hardly surprising given the tenor of the hearings. The states were almost unanimous
in their opposition to the bills while interstate business representatives generally supported them.'
In lobbying for the bills, the business representatives repeatedly stressed the need
for uniformity in state taxation. 23 Yet the degree of uniformity they sought is subject
to debate. The business representatives clearly sought uniform jurisdictional standards.
Multijurisdictional enterprises could only benefit from those rules which limited the
states' power to impose taxes or tax collection responsibility on them. The multistate
businesses, however, were much more ambivalent about uniform substantive regulation.233 Unlike uniform jurisdictional standards, uniform substantive regulation could
harm them by eliminating the possibility of undertaxation.234
The states were generally sensitive to business' asserted interest in uniformity but
were jealous of their taxing power and objected to federal intervention. 5 They argued that uniformity could and should be achieved by voluntary, cooperative state
action and pointed to the Multistate Tax Compact 36 and the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 7 among other things, as evidence that the states had
already made substantial progress toward uniformity.23 The business representatives,

2092, 93d Cong. (1973), S. 282, 93d Cong. (1973) (dealing solely with sales and use taxation), and
H.R. 2096, 93d Cong. (1973) (dealing with discriminatory taxation of wines)) [hereinafter 1973 State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing].
In addition, one of the bills, S. 983, 96th Cong. (1979), was discussed at a hearing on international tax treaties. International Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 3-22 (1979).
231. 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230 passim; S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227 passim;
1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230 passim.
232. See, e.g., 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 255, 257 (1980) (testimony of Charles
W. Wheeler, United States Chamber of Commerce; Thomas McHugh, Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers);
S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 4, 27, 84, 263, 418 (testimony of Harold Halfpenny, Nat'l Assoc.
of Wholesaler-Distributors; L. Clarke Budlong, The Borden Co., Inc.; John Mahoney, Johns-Manville
Corp.; Donald K. Barnes, Moorman Mfg. Co.; Sidney Peterson, Getty Oil Co.); 1973 State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230, at 86-87, 186, 243 (testimony of Leonard E. Kust,
United States Chamber of Commerce; L. Ward Mendenhall, Nationwide Advertising Specialty Co. and
Texad Specialty Co.; Paul L. Courtney, Nat'l Assoc. of Wholesaler-Distributors).
233. See, e.g., S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 75 (Richard Tveter, Council of State Taxation,
"Uniformity is definitely a requirement but we are all faced with what is uniformity and what is uniformity to one is not uniformity to another.").
234. See supra Section II.
235. See, e.g., 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 359, 370 (1980) (testimony of Arthur
Roemer, Nat'l Assoc. Of Tax Administrators; Theodore DeLooze, Oregon); S. 2173 Hearing, supra
note 227, at 43, 116-17, 290, 337 (testimony of Steven Mannear, Louisiana; James D. Whisenhand,
Florida; Edgar Lindley, Ohio; Gerome Caulfield, Minnesota); 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230, at 326, 367 (testimony of George Kinnear, Washington; Sydney
McKenzie, Florida). See also 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 368 (testimony of Jonathan
Rowe, Citizens for Tax Justice).
236. See supra Section I.
237. See supra Section I.
238. See, e.g., 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 359, 474 (testimony of Arthur Roemer,
National Assoc. of Tax Administrators; Eugene Corrigan, Multistate Tax Commission); S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 34, 37, 113, 157, 308, 473 (testimony of Charles Boswell, Alabama; Jayne
Ann Woods, Tennessee; James D. Whisenhand, Florida; Robert C. Wasson, South Carolina; Benjamin
Holderied, Michigan; Thomas Day, Missouri); 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230, at 103, 113 (testimony of Kenneth Back, Nat'l Assoc. of Tax Administrators; Byron
Dorgan, Multistate Tax Commission).
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in contrast, asserted that the limited success of the Multistate Tax Compact and similar
measures 9 demonstrated that the states were incapable of realizing uniformity
through voluntary cooperation and that federal legislation was essential. 2"
Since 1982, numerous bills have been introduced that address specific areas of
state taxation of interstate commerce,24 but no bills regulating multiple areas of state
taxation have been introduced.
F. Worldwide Unitary Taxation
Between 1979 and 1991, eighteen bills were introduced in Congress to prohibit
the use of the "worldwide combined reporting" method to tax corporate income242 as
well as limit state taxation of foreign source dividends. 243 In 1980, a total of twelve
states used the worldwide combined reporting method of taxation.2M By 1992, all of

239. By 1982, only 21 states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact and only 23 States
had adopted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.
240. See, e.g., S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 7, 46, 212, 248 (testimony of William C.
McCamant, Nat'l Assoc. of Wholesaler-Distributors; Lyle Bethune, Anderson, Clayton & Co.; Stanley
Fraser, St. Joe Paper Co.; Wayne A. Scheider, Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.); 1973 State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce Hearings, supra note 230, at 233 (Bums Stanley, Council on State Taxation).
But see id. at 220-21 (Frank Roberts, representing California-based corporations, wary of federal legislation).
Ironically, business opposition played an important role in the limited success of the Multistate
Tax Compact and UDITPA. See, e.g., 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 474 (testimony of
Eugene Corrigan, MTC); S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 76, 438, 442 (testimony of Richard
Tveter, Committee on State Taxation; Ted DeLooze, Oregon; Sterling Gallagher, Alaska); 1973 State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230, at 117, 232, 286 (testimony of Byron
Dorgan, MTC; Burns Stanley, Committee on State Taxation; Bruce Walker, California); see also United
States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 454 (1977) (suit by interstate business
challenging validity of Multistate Tax Compact).
241. See Section II passim.
Interestingly, of the three major areas consistently addressed in the bills discussed above, corporate income, gross receipts, and sales and use taxation, only sales and use taxation has been addressed
in bills introduced since 1982. Bills were also introduced addressing one aspect. of corporate income
taxation, worldwide unitary taxation, but no bills setting forth uniform jurisdictional standards for corporate income taxation or limitations on the percentage of corporate income that may be attributed to
each state have been introduced since 1982.
242. Under the worldwide combined reporting method, a state applies its apportionment formula to
the combined income of all corporations in a unitary group, including foreign corporate entities. "This
involves combining the income of (1) a foreign parent corporation with its U.S. subsidiary corporations
doing business in the State; or (2) foreign subsidiary corporations with their U.S. parent corporation
doing business in the state." Key Issues Affecting State Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Need Resolving, GAO Report to the Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means 31
(GAO/GGD-82-38 July 1, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 GAO Report].
243. S. 1775, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 2913, 102d Cong. (1991); S. 1139, 101st Cong. (1989);
H.R. 1390, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 2940, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 1843, 100th Cong. (1987); S.
1974, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 1113, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 687, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 3980, 99th
Cong. (1985); S. 3061, 98th Cong. (1984); S. 1225, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 2918, 98th Cong. (1983);
S. 655, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 1983, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 5076, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 5903,
96th Cong. (1979); S. 1688, 96th Cong. (1979).
In addition, three bills were introduced that prohibited unitary taxation but did not address state
taxation of foreign source dividends. H.R. 4049, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 4940, 98th Cong. (1984);
H.R. 6146, 98th Cong. (1984).
244. Those states were Alaska, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. State Taxation of Foreign Source Income:
Hearing before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 359 (1980) (hearing on H.R. 5076,
96th Cong. (1979)) [hereinafter 1980 House Unitary Hearing]. A 1982 GAO Report stated that thirteen
states used the worldwide combined reporting method at the time of their survey. The thirteen states
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the states had voluntarily eliminated or severely restricted their use of this method of
taxation." Not surprisingly, no bills have been introduced on the subject since 1991.
Between 1980 and 1986, four separate hearings were held on the bills prohibiting
worldwide combined reporting and limiting state taxation of foreign dividends."
Throughout the hearings, the states uniformly opposed the proposed legislation while
the business representatives strongly endorsed it.247 Moreover, the business representatives were not alone in their opposition to the worldwide combined reporting method.
Foreign governments also strongly opposed this method of taxation.
Article 9(4) of the United States-United Kingdom Tax Treaty was originally
drafted in 1975 to prohibit this method of taxation. 4 Although the prohibition was
deleted before final ratification of the Treaty in 1980, the House of Commons only
agreed to the treaty without the clause based on the understanding and expectation that
Congress would address the problem. 4 By 1980, the British government, the Dutch
government, and all nine members of the E.E.C. had officially criticized the unitary
tax.m In fact, when Prime Minister Thatcher visited the United States in September
of 1983, unitary taxation was at the top of her agenda in a discussion with President
Reagan and others.' Not only did foreign governments criticize the worldwide unitary tax, but foreign-based enterprises also vehemently objected to this form of taxation. In fact, a delegation from the London Chamber of Commerce cancelled a trip to
Florida solely because Florida had just passed a unitary tax. 2 In addition, a number
of Japanese corporations located operations outside of California because of its unitary
tax, and Japan's Federation of Economic Organizations announced that Japanese
companies would not locate operations in states with worldwide unitary taxation." 4
As a result of the pressure by foreign governments and a Supreme Court decision
upholding the constitutionality of California's use of the worldwide combined reporting

included all of the states listed in the 1980 House Unitary Hearing, except North Carolina, and two
additional states: New Hampshire and New York. 1982 GAO Report, supra note 242, at 31.
245. I HEI.LERTIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 9 8.16.
246. Review of Unitary Method of Taxation: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt
Management of the S. Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong. (1986) (hearing on S. 1974, 99th Cong. (1985)
and S. 1113, 99th Cong. (1985)) [hereinafter 1986 Unitary Hearing]; Unitary Tax: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong. (1984) (hearing
on propriety of federal legislation in general) [hereinafter 1984 Unitary Hearing]; 1980 Worldwide
Hearing, supra note 230; 1980 House Unitary Hearing, supra note 244.
247. 1986 Unitary Hearing, supra note 246 passim; 1984 Unitary Hearing, supra note 246 passim;
1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230 passim; 1980 House Unitary Hearing, supra note 244 passim.
248. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T. 5668,
5677.
249. 1980 House Unitary Hearing, supra note 244, at 152.
250. 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 205. See also 1984 Unitary Hearing, supra note
244, at 3 (noting that Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom had all
lodged formal protests against worldwide unitary taxation).
251. 1984 Unitary Hearing, supra note 246, at 1.
252. Id. at 4-5, 138-139 (93% of Fortune 500 respondents to Tax Watch survey indicated that
Florida's unitary tax would have a negative effect on their future decisions to locate, relocate, or expand facilities or operations in Florida).
253. Id. at 31; 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230, at 63-64, 68-71.
254. 1984 Unitary Tax Hearing, supra note 244, at 138. See also Portland's Tim ORaFGON.i
(Sept. 20, 1984) (Japanese businesses announce that they will not locate new plants or expand existing
facilities in any state that applies worldwide apportionment to them).
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method against a Delaware corporation and its foreign subsidiaries, 5 President Reagan appointed a commission, the Worldwide Unitary Tax Working Group, to study the
matter in 1983. After a year of study, the Working Group, composed of representatives
from federal and state government as well as business, 6 issued a final report in August of 1994."5 In that report, the Working Group agreed that states should limit unitary combination for both U.S. and foreign based companies to the water's edge."
In his transmittal letter, the Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan stated that he
would recommend federal legislation giving effect to a water's edge limitation on state
unitary taxation if there were not "sufficient signs of appreciable progress by the
states" in adopting the agreed principles by July 31, 1995."5 The following year, the
Secretary followed through on that threat. 2'
In 1984, Florida repealed the worldwide apportionment legislation26' it had enacted the preceding year.262 In 1985, Arizona limited apportionment to U.S. water's
edge income.263 Similarly, by 1987, Oregon, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, and Utah had all limited combined reporting to water's
edge.2' California granted taxpayers the option to limit apportionment to the U.S.
water's edge in 1988,26 and Alaska enacted water's edge legislation in 1991.'
Thus, by 1992, no state applied worldwide combination without a water's edge or
domestic corporation limitation.267
G. Individual Income Taxation
Between 1971 and 1989, more than fifty bills were introduced in Congress to

255. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
256. For a list of the twenty members of the Working Group see FINAL REPORT OF THE
WoRLDwIDE UNITARY TAXATION WORKING GROUP, CHAIRMAN'S

REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTAL

VIEWS,

app. A (Aug. 1984) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
257. Id.
258. Id. at ii.
"Water's edge" corporations were to include the following: (1) U.S. corporations included in a
consolidated return for Federal corporate tax purposes; (2) U.S. possession corporations; (3) companies
incorporated in U.S. possessions or territories; (4) domestic international sales corporations; (5) certain
corporations presumed to be part of the unitary business; (6) foreign corporations with at least a
threshold level of business activity in the United States; and (7) U.S. corporations not included in (1)
and with more than 50 percent of their voting stock owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
another U.S. corporation. Id. at § A of Annex D.
The Working Group also agreed to the following principles (1) increased federal administrative
assistance and cooperation with the states to promote full taxpayer disclosure and accountability, and
(2) a competitive balance for U.S. multinationals, foreign multinationals, and purely domestic business.
State and business representatives were unable to reach agreement on the proper state tax treatment of
foreign-source dividends and of U.S. based corporations operating primarily abroad (so-called "80/20
corporations"). These issues were left for resolution at the state level in accordance with the principle
that there should be a competitive balance. Id.
259. Id. at iii.
260. 1986 Unitary Hearing, supra note 246, at 45 ("On November 8th of last year, Reagan directed the Secretary of Treasury to submit proposed legislation to Congress, and that legislation is embodied in S. 1974, one of the bills Congress consider[ed] at [the] hearing.').
261. 1984 Fla. Laws ch. 84-549.
262. Fla. Income Tax Code, FLA. STAT. ch. 220.135, amended by 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-349.
263. 1985 Ariz. Sess. Laws 109, codified as ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 43-1101 (1996).
264. I HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 8.16.
265. CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 25110 (West 1997).
266. ALASKA STAT. § 43,20.073 (Michie 1996).
267. I HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 1 8.16[1].
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regulate state taxation of nonresident individuals.26 Fifteen of the bills limited the
states' authority to tax nonresidents on income derived from services performed in
federal areas 2' 6 or from federal employment, 70 while fifteen of the bills prohibited
the states from taxing the income of nonresidents earned in the state.27' Fourteen of
the bills limited the states' tax rate on nonresidents to 50 or 331/3% of the rate imposed
on residents." 2 Six of the bills either codified the source tax principle273 or prohibited against discriminatory taxation of nonresident income. 4
Interestingly, the vast majority of the bills were introduced early in the first
session of Congress, and all but four of the bills were introduced in the House. Nevertheless, despite the extraordinary number of bills and their early introduction, not only
did no bill make it to the floor of the House or Senate, but not a single hearing was
held on any of the bills.27

268. H.R. 2739, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1731, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1096, 101st Cong.
(1989); H.R. 1091, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 2759, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 3181, 100th Cong.
(1987); H.R. 773, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 2152, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 552, 98th Cong. (1983);
H.R. 553, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 1549, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 3122, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R.
1291, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 180, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 744, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 3696, 97th
Cong. (1981); S. 569, 96th Cong. (1981); S. 994, 96th Cong. (1981); H.R. 1942, 96th Cong. (1979);
H.R. 2450, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 5884, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 10435, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R.
10576, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 11154, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 13742, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R.
14268, 95th Cong. (1978); S. 1595, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 705, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 3872, 95th
Cong. (1977); H.R. 5988, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 14587, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. 1043, 94th Cong.
(1975); H.R. 2004, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 3584, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 1748, 94th Cong. (1975);
H.R. 17170, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 722, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 649, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1023,
93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1788, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 2193, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 2341, 93d Cong.
(1973); H.R. 7581, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 10227, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 10228, 93d Cong. (1973);
H.R. 15880, 92d Cong. (1972); H.R. 24, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 380, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 1487,
92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 1728, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 5466, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 5818, 92d Cong.
(1971); H.R. 6922, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 8595, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 9763, 92d Cong. (1971).
In addition, six bills regulating multiple areas of state and local taxation included provisions
governing individual income taxation. H.R. 6402, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 9, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R.
669, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 977, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1538, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 2536, 92d
Cong. (1971).
269. H.R. 2739, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 552, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 3122, 97th Cong. (1981);
H.R. 744, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 569, 96th Cong. (1981); S. 994, 96th Cong. (1981); S. 1595, 95th
Cong. (1977); H.R. 705, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 3872, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 14587, 94th Cong.
(1976); H.R. 1748, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 17170, 93d Cong. (1974); H.R. 2193, 93d Cong. (1973);
H.R. 10228, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1728, 92d Cong. (1971).
270. H.R. 2759, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 773, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 1549, 98th Cong. (1983);
H.R. 1291, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 5884, 96th Cong. (1979).
271. H.R. 2152, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 553, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 180, 97th Cong. (1981);
H.R. 3696, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 2450, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 10435, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R.
10576, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 11154, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 13742, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R.
14268, 95th Cong. (1978); S. 722, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 7581, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 10227, 93d
Cong. (1973); H.R. 380, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 1487, 92d Cong. (1971).
272. H.R. 1942, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 5988, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 2004, 94th Cong. (1975);
H.R. 3584, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 649, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1023, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1788,
93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 2341, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 15880, 92d Cong. (1972); H.R. 6922, 92d
Cong. (1971); H.R. 8595, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 24, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 5466, 92d Cong.
(1971); H.R. 5818, 92d Cong. (1971).
273. H.R. 1731, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1096, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1091, 101st Cong.
(1989); H.R. 1043, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 9763, 92d Cong. (1971).
274. H.R. 3181, 100th Cong. (1987).
275. In a hearing on a number of bills that did not include provisions on state individual income
taxation, one witness, Mario Procaccino of New York, offered testimony in -support of H.R. 977, 93d
Cong. (1973), a bill that included a provision on state individual income taxation. The witness, however, recommended that that provision be deleted because no hearings had ever been held on the subject.
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Since 1989, only one bill has been introduced in Congress to regulate state taxation of nonresident individuals. That bill was a very limited bill that prohibits Oregon
from taxing compensation paid to a Washington resident for service as a federal employee at a federal hydroelectric facility located on the Columbia River." 6
H. Sales and Use Taxation
Members of Congress have repeatedly introduced bills regulating sales and use
taxation, but Congress has yet to enact any such legislation. Between 1971 and 1982,
twenty-three bills" were introduced in Congress to limit the states' power to impose
use tax collection responsibility on out-of-state mail order sellers,278 and the issue
was considered at two separate sets of hearings.' Not only were the bills consistent
with the Court's decision in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,28 °
prohibiting states from imposing use tax collection responsibility on an out-of-state
mail order house with no physical presence in the state, but the bills imposed additional limitations on use taxation." Only one bill was introduced during that time period
to expand the states' power to impose use tax collection responsibility and overrule
legislatively the Bellas Hess decision.2
By 1985, however, the tide began to turn, and members of Congress began to
introduce bills to overrule the Bellas Hess decision. In fact, between 1985 and 1996,
seventeen such bills were introduced, 3 and five separate sets of hearings were held
on the issue.' No bills were introduced to limit the states' jurisdiction to impose use

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce of the S. Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong. 139 (1973).
276. H.R. 4991, 103d Cong. (1994).
277. H.R. 6402, 97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 8277, 96th Cong. (1980); S. 983, 96th Cong. (1979);
H.R. 5, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 2173, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R. 9, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 669, 95th
Cong. (1977); S. 2080, 94th Cong. (1975); S. 282, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 1245, 93d Cong. (1973); S.
1962, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 2092, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 977, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1453, 93d
Cong. (1973); S. 3333, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 4080, 92d Cong. (1972); S. 317, 92d Cong. (1971); S.
1210, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 1453, 93d Cong. (1973); H.R. 1538, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 2536, 92d
Cong. (1971); H.R. 4267, 92d Cong. (1971); H.R. 4770, 92d Cong. (1971).
278. All but four of those bills addressed multiple areas of state taxation as discussed infra at
Section 11I F. The four bills that solely addressed sales and use taxation were: S. 282, 93d Cong.
(1973); H.R. 1453, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 1210, 92d Cong. (1971); and H.R. 4267, 92d Cong. (1971).
279. S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227; 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra
note 230. Those hearings also covered other aspects of state taxation such as corporate income taxes,
gross receipts taxes, and federal judicial review of state taxation.
280. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). See infra Section
II C.
281. For example, many of the bills prohibited states from imposing use taxes on motor vehicles
brought into the state by new residents.
282. S. 2811, 93d Cong. (1973). Whether Congress had the power to overrule legislatively the
Bellas Hess decision prior to 1992 was subject to debate.
283. H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 545, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1825, 103 Cong. (1994); H.R.
2230, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 480, 101st Cong. (1989); S. 2368, 100th Cong. (1988); H.R. 1891, 100th
Cong. (1987); H.R. 1242, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 1099, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 639, 100th Cong.
(1987); H.R. 3521, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 5021, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 4365, 99th Cong. (1986);
S. 2913, 99th Cong. (1986); S. 1510, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 3549, 99th Cong. (1985).
284. Interstate Use Tax Collection: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong.
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 Use Tax Hearing]; Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and the Equity
in Interstate Competition Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the H. Comm of the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter 1987 House Use Tax Hearing;
Collection of State Sales and Use Taxes by Out-of-State Vendors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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tax collection responsibilities during that time period.'
Congress' failure to enact legislation in the use tax area appears to be due, in
large part, to the lack of agreement between the states and the business community.' In the 1970's, the business community generally supported the legislation that
was introduced at the time to limit the states' jurisdiction to impose use tax collection
responsibility while the state governments unanimously opposed it.' Contrariwise,
when legislation was later introduced to expand the states' jurisdiction, the states and
retail sellers supported the legislation while the mail order companies opposed it.'
The interested parties' positions seem to have been driven in large part by narrow self-interest. 9 In the 1970's, when pending legislation imposed uniform jurisdictional rules limiting the states' power to impose use tax collection responsibility,
mail order sellers argued that they needed a uniform nexus rule in order to stay in
business. They expressed little interest in uniform substantive law, such as uniform tax
bases, which would simplify their collection responsibilities. Instead, they simply
sought to evade use tax collection responsibility. In contrast, when bills overruling
Bellas Hess and expanding the states' jurisdiction to impose use tax collection
responsibility became the norm, the mail order sellers began to cry for uniform substantive law. Similarly, the states argued that federal intervention was unnecessary
when pending legislation benefitted the mail order industry but argued that federal
legislation was not only appropriate, but imperative, when the tide turned in the 1980's
and pending legislation began to expand their jurisdiction. Yet, despite the cry for
legislative intervention, the states were completely unwilling to relinquish any sovereignty and agree to uniform tax bases which would simplify use tax collection and
provide for the greater good.'

Tax'n and Debt Management of the S. Committee on Finance, 100th Cong. (1987) [hereinafter 1987
Senate Use Tax Hearing]; Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. (1987) [hereinafter
Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 Hearing]; State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n and Debt Management of the S. Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong. (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing].
285. Two resolutions, however, were introduced that resolved that any proposed legislation requiring
mail-order companies to collect out-of-state sales taxes be rejected. S. Res. 123, 102d Cong. (1991); S.
Res. 80, 101st Cong. (1989).
286. See S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 99-100 ("The reason we've been at this so long is
because up until now the gap between what state and local governments could tolerate and what the
businesses could live with in an interstate tax reform bill seemed to be unbridgeable."); 1973 State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230, at 1 ("Staff work in preparation for subcommittee action has made clear that the reason for the failure of Congress to act, among other
things, has been the almost total lack of agreement among the interested parties - the States, their
tax administrators, and the principal business interests involved.").
287. S. 2173 Interstate Taxation Hearings, supra note 227 passim; 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearings, supra note 230 passim.
288. 1994 Use Tax Hearing, supra note 284 passim; 1987 House Use Tax Hearing, supra note
284 passim; 1987 Senate Use Tax Hearing, supra note 284 passim; Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act
of 1987 Hearing, supra note 284 passim; 1985 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra
note 284 passim.
289. In fact, at one of the hearings, a state representative declared, "For at least 15 years I have
been on the scene in this struggle between the divergent views of business and the States. It is my
observation that each side operates at least to some extent in a position of enlightened self-interest;
that is, each side seeks the best economic position possible." S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 438
(comment by Ted DeLooze, Chief Counsel, Tax Division, Dep't of Justice, State of Oregon).
290. See supra Section I1 C.
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I. Summary
The empirical evidence suggests that Congress may enact legislation regulating
discrete instances of state and local taxation of interstate commerce if the legislation
(1) will personally benefit members of Congress,"9 (2) will benefit a specific, welldefined interest group that orchestrates an extensive campaign with limited opposition,' or (3) represents a compromise between the states and taxpayers and is part
of a much larger legislative package." 3 The empirical evidence further suggests that
Congress generally will not enact legislation regulating state and local taxation if the
legislation offers diffuse benefits unless the states and taxpayers are able or willing to
reach a compromise on the subject." 4 Finally, the empirical evidence suggests states
may voluntarily enact legislation preempting the need for federal legislation if federal
intervention appears likely. 29

291.

See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-67, 91 Stat. 271 (1977); see also discussion supra Section I1 B.
Of course, not all bills specially benefitting Members of Congress have been enacted. In 1985,
a bill was introduced that would have prevented any state, other than the state which a Member of
Congress was elected to represent, from imposing a property tax on the automobile used by the Member to attend sessions of Congress. H.R. 1293, 99th Cong. (1985). In 1987, a bill was introduced that
would have extended preferential income tax treatment of Pub. L. No. 95-67 to the spouses and
children of Members of Congress. H.R. 2555, 100th Cong. (1987). In addition, the bill would have
expanded the protection of Pub. L. No. 95-67 by prohibiting any state, other than the state which a
Member of Congress is elected to represent, from taxing income sourced in the state. Neither bill was
reported out of committee.
292. See supra Section I1 A. See also Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959), which prohibits
states from taxing the income of a corporation whose only business activity within the state is the solicitation of orders for tangible goods if the orders are sent outside the state for approval and the
goods are delivered from outside the state, would seem to fall within this category. One scholar noted
that "somewhat truncated congressional hearings were held [on Pub. L. No. 86-272]. At these hearings
the fears and apprehensions of business rang like. a forte anvil chorus, in comparison with only a pianissimo refrain from the tax collectors and others in counseling congressional caution." Hartman, Public
Law 86-272, supra note 340, at 359. Another commentator described the legislation as "a piece of
hasty, hysteri[call legislation . . . pressured through . . . Congress by a highly organized and certainly
skillfully handled group of trade organizations." Robert L. Roland, State Taxation of Interstate Income:
A State Tax Administrator's Viewpoint, 12 TAx EXEC. 35, 35 (1959). See also Paul Studenski, The
Need for Federal Curbs on state Taxes on Interstate Commerce: An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L.
REV. 1121 (1960).
293. See supra Section II C (discussing Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54-55 (1976);
Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 31, 94 Stat. 793, 823-34 (1980); Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 532(b), 96 Stat. 671,
701-02 (1982)) and Section II D (discussing Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 532, 96 Stat. 324, 701). See also
Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 21, 89 Stat. 160 (1982) (prohibiting certain stock transfer taxes); Pub. L. No. 94455 § 2121(a), 90 Stat. 1914 (1976) (prohibiting discriminatory taxes on electrical energy)).
294. See, e.g., supra Section III E (discussing the legislative experience with respect to the Interstate Tax Acts) and Section IMIH (discussing legislation regarding sales and use taxation).
295. See, e.g., supra Section III F (discussing the legislative experience with respect to worldwide
unitary taxation).
See also 1980 House Unitary Hearing, supra note 244, at 141 (Rep. Ullman, Chairman: "I
think the ebb and the flow about interest in uniformity comes when there are Congressional hearings
about it and when we do not have Congressional hearings about it, it tends to lose itself.... ");S.
2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 116, 389 (S.Mathias: "[Tihere's no doubt about it, the States have
moved toward uniformity. I think that my colleagues in the Congress should be given some credit
because having kept the subject alive it's given the States certain incentive to try to keep one step
ahead of the sheriff in this business."); 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra
note 230, at 4 (S.Hansen: "I have long held the belief that in most instances the Federal Government
should leave the resolution of problems such as [state taxation of interstate commerce] to the states
themselves. However, it may well be that these hearings will directly focus the states' attention upon
the difficulties faced by interstate business operations and will precipitate state cooperation and a gen-
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IV. LIKELIHOOD OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION MANDATING MORE
UNIFORMITY IN STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
The empirical evidence casts serious doubt on the likelihood of Congress enacting legislation mandating more uniformity in state and local taxation. More uniformity
would not personally benefit members of Congress nor would it benefit a specific,
well-defined interest group. Instead, it would offer diffuse benefits to society at large
by eliminating many of the drags imposed on our economy by the current system.2
Given that more uniformity would offer diffuse benefits, the empirical evidence suggests that Congress is only likely to enact legislation mandating more uniformity if the
states and taxpayers are willing to reach an agreement on the subject.'
As more uniformity would impose specific costs on particular taxpayers and
states and benefit society at large,"' a compromise would require that the states and
taxpayers look beyond their narrow self-interest to reach a compromise and try to
further the greater good. The empirical evidence, however, indicates that the states and
taxpayers usually take positions in hearings on state and local tax legislation that are
driven in large part by narrow self-interest and rarely reflect the greater good.'
Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that Congress is unlikely to enact legislation
mandating more uniformity in state and local taxation in the near future.
The public choice theory of legislation gives additional support to this pessimistic
view. The Public Choice School applies economic theory to analyze the political process.' It assumes that "all political participants are rational, egoistic utility
eral consensus with respect to these problems."). See also id.at 103 (Kenneth Back, President, Nat'l
Assoc. of Tax Administrators, "While there was much disagreement with the study of the House Judiciary Committee at the time the study was completed, we would be the first ones to say that the
study spurred the states to take action for uniformity.").
296. See supra Section H D.
297. See supra Section III C-H passim. See also 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
Hearing, supra note 244, at 1 (In opening the subcommittee hearings, Senator Mondale counsels that
"the reason for the failure of Congress to act, among other things, has been the almost total lack of
agreement among the interested parties.. . .If, therefore, the subcommittee's hearings are to be productive, and if these hearings are to lead to a legislative proposal, there should, if possible, be agreement among the interested parties on the principal points of that proposal.").
298. See supra Section III C-H passim.
299. See supra Section Ell A-H passim. In fact, at one of the hearings, Ted DeLooze, an attorney
representing the Department of Revenue for the State of Oregon declared, "For at least 15 years I
have been on the scene in this struggle between the divergent views of business and the States. It is
my observation that each side operates at least to some extent in a position of enlightened self-interest;
that is, each side seeks the best economic position possible." S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 438
(comment by Ted DeLooze, Chief Counsel, Tax Division, Dep't of Justice, State of Oregon).
300. Public choice theory is a complex discipline drawing from economics, political science, and
the social sciences. Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a "Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1541, 1542 n.1 (1993). Indeed, due to
its interdisciplinary nature, there appears to be no single universally accepted definition of the theory.
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHm.up P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL INTRODUCTION 12
(1991) ("how to define 'public choice' itself is sharply disputed"); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEo. L. J.457, 458 & n.10 (noting
that dispute between referees regarding definition of public choice may have been attributable to turf
battle between economists and political scientists).
The theory has two separate strands: social choice theory and interest group theory. The former
addresses how decisions are made while the latter looks at the incidence and influence of interest
groups. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for
Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275, 283 n.28 (1988). This article will focus on the interest
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3°
maximizers""
who "allocate their limited means among alternative pursuits to maximize their personal satisfaction."3 2 Proponents of the interest group strand of the theory 3 believe that interest groups play a central role in determining when Congress
will legislate.' They view legislation as an economic transaction in which legislation
is supplied to interest groups who demand it 5 and contend that the market for legislation is a badly functioning one."

Public choice scholars believe that the formation of interest groups is highly
selective. Applying free rider analysis, they contend that interest groups will most
often form to represent the interests of small groups and will rarely form to represent
diffuse interests, such as the interests of consumers or other ordinary citizens. As Professor Rubin has explained:
According to the free-rider analysis, a rational egoist is willing to pay $10 to a
lobbying organization to secure $50 of benefit from the legislation that results. If
everyone with the same interests is contributing $10, however, the egoist can withdraw the contribution, while the legislature, once it acts, cannot deny the benefit.
Since everyone is an egoist in the world of public choice, everyone prefers to "free
ride;" but if this occurs, interest groups will never achieve their aims. The groups
can only circumvent this problem if they are able to police their members and
sanction those who refuse to contribute. This is relatively easy to do when a group
is small, when its members have ongoing personal or business relationships, and
when each member has a relatively large stake in the outcome. It is more difficult
for the general public and "public interest" groups, whose members are generally
strangers. Thus, the free-riding tendencies of rational egoists seem to provide an
economic explanation for the dominance of small special interest groups over the
"public interest." 3'

Due to the unequal formation of interest groups, public choice scholars view the de-

group strand of public choice analysis, which is also sometimes referred to as the economic theory of

legislation. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest

Group Model, 86 COLUmB. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).
301.

Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Read-

ing of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5 (1991). See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 878 (1987) (citing D. MUELLER, PUBUC
CHoicE 1 (1979)).

302. Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice:
A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993, 996 (1988). See also Jonathan I. Silberman
& Garey C. Durden, Determining Legislative Preferences on the Minimum Wage: An Economic Approach, 84 J. POL. ECON. 317, 318 (1976).
303. See supra note 300.

304. Rubin, supra note 301, at 9 ("Simply put, the theory holds that small bodies, groups of powerful or wealthy people, organized around some common interest, will exercise disproportionate influence on the political process.").
305. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 300, at 285; Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CMn. L. REv. 263, 266 (1982).

306. Eskridge, supra note 300, at 285. See also Macey, supra note 300, at 230 ("The economic
theory of legislation does not predict that, all laws will enrich the few at the expense of the many, but
it does predict that this will be the dominant outcome and that there will be a trend in this direction.").
307. Rubin, supra note 301, at 10-11. See also Eskridge, supra note 300, at 285-86; Macey, supra
note 300, at 231-32; Farber & Frickey, supra note 301, at 892.
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mand side of the market for legislation as highly biased.
On the supply side,' public choice scholars contend that legislators, as "rational, egoistic utility maximizers,"' 3 are motivated solely by self-interest," ' and
that self-interest is often identified as the "desire to maximize their chance of
reelection." 3"' Public choice scholars may tie legislators' desire for reelection to interest groups by asserting that voters lack perfect information about a legislator's conduct,
and thus "elections may turn on financial backing, publicity, and endorsements, '3t2
which organized interest groups are ready and able to provide.3 3 In analyzing the
supply side of the legislative equation, some public choice scholars also factor in the
"ungrateful electorate" phenomenon in predicting legislative behavior. That phenomenon reflects the curiosity that interest groups give less weight to a vote in favor of
their preferences than to a vote against their wishes.31 4
Combining these diverse elements, public choice scholarship predicts that legislators will generally enact legislation that favors cohesive special interest groups
which have clearly defined objectives and will accrue large potential benefits from the
legislation.3" ' Public choice scholarship further predicts that legislators will tend to
avoid legislating or delegating responsibility to an administrative agency if a policy
imposes concentrated costs, that is, costs on select individuals or groups.316 Finally,
public choice scholarship predicts that legislators will tend to ignore or favor symbolic
laws in matters involving diffuse benefits and diffuse costs because they will not be

308. Some scholars contend that legislators supply the legislation while others contend that the public supplies the legislation with the legislators only acting as brokers. See Macey, supra note 300, at
228.
309. Rubin, supra note 301, at 5.
310. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 300, at 22; Farber & Frickey, supra note 301, at 890. But
see Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel"
Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 181 (1988) (contending that narrow self-interest is not the sole motive of
legislators but conceding that it is a significant motive).
311. Rubin, supra note 301, at 14 (footnote added). See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUrES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLlcy 55-56 (2d ed. 1995). See, e.g., Barry Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The
Political Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 155 (1981)
("Representatives are assumed to maximize the probability of reelection based on their influence over
legislative policy decisions on behalf of their constituents"); MORRIS FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL
CALLS AND CONSTITUENCIES 38 (1974) ("Mhe primary goal of the typical congressman is reelection."); DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974) (legislation can be understood by "simple abstract assumption" that Congressmen are "single-minded seekers of reelection.").
Of course, not all public choice scholars believe that Congressmen are motivated solely by the
desire to seek reelection. See, e.g., RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMrrrEEs 1 (1973) (behavior
of members of Congress dictated by three basic goals: achieving reelection, gaining influence with the
House, and making good public policy); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY
51 (1957) (candidates and legislators seek primarily to be elected or to receive other private benefits).
Indeed, Mayhew, himself, admitted that his model's assumption that legislators only act so as to be
reelected did "violence to the facts." MAYHEW, supra, at 13. Nevertheless, he argued that legislative
activity could be understood by using the "simple abstraction" that Congressmen are "single-minded
seekers of reelection." Id. at 5.
312. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 300, at 23.
313. Interest groups may also affect legislation by "controlling the flow of information to legislators
on particular issues.. . [and thus] 'distortling] congressmen's thinking on an issue-normally all an interest group needs to achieve its ends."' Macey, supra note 300, at 230-31(citation omitted).
314. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 311, at 55.
315. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECO. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
316. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 311, at 55; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL
ORGANizATIONS 334-36 (1973).
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As discussed in Section II above, legislation mandating more uniformity in state
and local taxation generally would provide diffuse benefits and concentrated costs; that
is, it would benefit society at large but would impose particular costs on particular
taxpayers.3' 8 Thus, public choice scholarship generally predicts that Congress is unlikely to enact such legislation. A closer look at congressional activity in the state and
local tax area described in Section H above illustrates that the activity is fairly, but
not completely, consistent with public choice theory.
First, the formation of interest groups appears to be consistent with public choice
theory. As discussed above, public choice scholars predict that interest groups will
most often form to represent the interests of small groups and will rarely form to represent diffuse interests, such as the interests of consumers or other ordinary citizens.
As public choice theory would predict, the state and local tax hearings are replete with
submissions from organizations representing discrete groups of taxpayers while submissions from groups representing taxpayers as a whole are rare.3 1 .
One might argue, however, that the diffuse interests of the general public are in
fact represented in the state and local tax hearings by the states and the interest groups
representing the states.3' To the extent that the general public shares the same interests as the states, the states probably do adequately represent the general public's interests. For example, federal legislation granting a break on state taxes to a particular
group of taxpayers imposes a diffuse cost on all other taxpayers in the state. Those
taxpayers must either pay higher taxes for the same services or receive fewer benefits
from the state. The legislation imposes an identical cost on the states: they must either
demand more revenue from other taxpayers or make due with less tax revenue. In such
cases, the states probably adequately represent the harmed taxpayers.
To the extent, however, that the interest of a large group of taxpayers diverges
from that of the state, the taxpayers cannot rely on the states to represent their interest. 321' For example, as discussed above, 22 between 1971 and 1989, more than fifty

317. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 311, at 55. See also WILSON, supra note 316, at 332-33.
318. More uniformity would also provide some concentrated benefits. See generally supra note 78.
319. For example, 11 different organizations representing particular business interests (the American
Apparel Manufacturers Association, the American Chamber of Commerce, the United Kingdom, the
Committee on State Taxation, the State Chambers of Commerce, the Confederation of British Industry,
the Tax Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the German-American Chamber of Commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce, the
Tax Executives Institute, and the National Association of Wholesalers-Distributors) testified at a 1980
Senate hearing on unitary taxation. In contrast, only one organization, Citizens for Tax Justice, represented the interests of ordinary citizens at that hearing. See 1980 Worldwide Hearing, supra note 230,

at rn-IV.

Similarly, business interests were represented by six different organizations while individuals
were only represented by one organization, the National Taxpayers Union, at a 1987 House hearing on
use tax collection. Moreover, five additional witnesses represented particular businesses at that hearing
while no individual testified on behalf of consumers at the hearing. See generally Interstate Sales Tax
Collection Act of 1987 Hearing, supra note 284.
320. The state and local tax hearings were overflowing with testimony from representatives of individual states and groups of states. For example, the hearings on S. 2173 contain testimony from more
than 20 different states. S.2173 Hearing, supra note 227 passim. For a general discussion of state and
local governments as interest groups, see ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, GOVERNMENTS As INTEREST GROUPS:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL LOBBYING AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1995).

321. See CAMNSA, supra note 320, at 23 (noting that governmental groups are "representative by
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bills were introduced in Congress to regulate state taxation of nonresidents. Yet, not a
single bill made it to hearing. The absence of hearings on the subject indicates that
neither the states nor any other interest group forcefully represented the interests of the
nonresidents who would have benefitted from the legislation. 23 In fact, had hearings
been held on any of the bills, there is little doubt but that the states would have lobbied against the bills and the nonresidents' interests.324
In addition, the legislative experience in the individual income tax area appears
reasonably, but not completely, consistent with public choice theory. As noted above,
the model predicts that Congress will enact laws that provide concentrated benefits and
diffuse costs but will not enact bills that provide diffuse benefits and concentrated
costs. The two laws that Congress enacted that affected state taxation of individuals,
Public Law 104-95 and Public Law 95-67, clearly provided concentrated benefits.3"
Specifically, Public Law 104-95, which prohibits states from taxing certain "pension
income" of nonresidents, benefitted the select group of individuals who earned pension
income in a state that taxed nonresidents on such income and then retired to a state
that does not tax such income.326 Similarly, Public Law 95-67, which prohibits certain state taxation of members of Congress, benefitted the members of Congress who
must reside in a state other than the state that they represent in Congress while Congress is in session. In contrast, the fifty plus bills generally regulating state taxation of
nonresidents which Congress did not enact benefitted much larger groups of individuals and thus provided much more diffuse benefits.
Public Law 95-67, however, is not necessarily entirely consistent with public
choice theory. To the extent that proponents of public choice scholarship contend that
legislative behavior is driven by the rank self-interest of legislators,327 enactment of

their very nature" but that they "represent subnational governments themselves in addition to (and
sometimes instead of) their citizens").
322. See supra Section ml H.
323. The states' unwillingness to represent the nonresidents' interest is hardly surprising in light of
the fact that the nonresidents are unlikely to be voters in the state.
324. Tellingly, in one of the two instances in which Congress did enact legislation limiting state
taxation of nonresident income, Pub. L. No. 104-95, 109 Stat. 979 (1996), a grass roots organization,
RESIST, formed to represent the interest of the discrete group of individuals who benefitted from the
legislation. In the other instance in which Congress acted, Pub. L. No. 95-67, 91 Stat. 271 (1977), the
legislation personally benefitted members of Congress and they did not need the states, to represent
their interest.
325. Whether those laws involved concentrated costs or distributive costs depends on whether the
states as an entity are taken into account. Each of the statutes imposed a distributive cost on all of
the taxpayers in the states that would otherwise have received tax revenue from the individuals who
escaped taxation as a result of the legislation. The statutes also imposed a concentrated cost on the
states that were prohibited from taxing the individuals who benefitted from the statutes.
326. A 1992 Congressional Research Service Report identified three states, California, Idaho, and
Oregon, that were known to tax nonresidents on pension income earned in the state. 1995 Pension
Hearing, supra note 92, at 51. Individuals who earned pension income in those three states and then
retired to a state that does not tax pension income clearly benefitted from Public Law 104-95. The
Report also identified 19 other states whose tax laws authorized the taxation of nonresident pension income, but had not promulgated explicit guidance with respect to whether they would enforce such provisions. Id. Individuals who earned pension income in those 19 states and then retired to a state that
does not tax such income might have also benefitted from the legislation.
The law also benefitted the states, such as Nevada, that did not tax individuals on pension
income and sought to recruit individuals to the state on that basis.
327. See, e.g., Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 310, at 181 n.7 (contending that amendment to
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, which substantially reduced income tax liability, of
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Public Law 95-67 appears consistent with that theory. Members of Congress obviously
personally benefitted from Public Law 95-67 as it prohibits certain states from taxing
their income." To the extent, however, that public choice scholars contend that legislative behavior is driven by the legislator's primary goal of reelection,3 9 Public
Law 95-67 appears to contradict that theory. The risk of multiple taxation that led to
enactment of Public Law 95-67 was not limited to members of Congress. Indeed, "tens
of thousands" 3" of other individuals faced the same risk of multiple taxation. Nevertheless, Public Law 95-67 only addressed the problem as applied to members of Congress, and members of Congress risked alienating voters by passing special legislation
designed solely to benefit themselves.331
Enactment of the statutes prohibiting discriminatory state and local taxation of
interstate transportation carriers332 also appear reasonably consistent with public
choice theory. Just as Public Law 104-95 and Public Law 95-67 clearly provided concentrated benefits, so too did the statutes prohibiting discriminatory state and local
taxation of interstate carriers.333 The statutes benefitted interstate rail, motor, and air
carriers by protecting them from the risk of discriminatory state taxation.334
335
Congress' failure to enact legislation prohibiting worldwide unitary taxation
appears less consistent with public choice theory. Such legislation clearly would have
provided concentrated benefits. Specifically, it would have benefitted the international
businesses which were subject to the worldwide combined reporting method and which
lobbied heavily in favor of the legislation. 3" Of course, the states' voluntarily enactment of legislation eliminating worldwide unitary taxation appears reasonably consistent with public choice theory. 37
To the extent that public choice scholarship predicts that legislators will tend to
avoid legislating if a policy imposes concentrated costs or will try to persuade conflicting groups to reach a compromise in the case of conflicting demand patterns,
Congress' enactment of legislation prohibiting state and local head taxes on airline
passengers and its failure to enact any of the bills regulating multiple areas of state and

members of Congress, was consistent with public choice theory).
328. See 122 CONG. REc. 22,873 (1976) (Rep. Bauman of Maryland notes that approximately 100
members of Congress would personally benefit from the legislation).
329. See supra note 311.
330. 122 CONG. REc. 22,871 (1976) (Rep. Smith of Iowa "object[s] to making a special category
for Members of Congress when, in fact, double taxation applies to tens of thousands of people in this

country.").

331. In fact, some members of Congress publicly objected to the legislation because of this appearance of impropriety. See authorities cited supra note 146.
332. See infra Section re(C).
333. Similarly, whether those laws involved concentrated costs or diffuse costs depends on whether
the states as an entity are taken into account. See generally supra note 325 and accompanying text.
334. One might also argue that the statutes imposed concentrated costs on the intrastate
transportation carriers by removing a competitive advantage they received through the otherwise permissible discriminatory taxation.
335. See supra Section III F.
336. Id. On the other hand, one might argue that Congress' failure to enact legislation prohibiting
worldwide unitary taxation was in fact consistent with public choice scholarship. Arguably, such legislation would have imposed concentrated costs as well as concentrated benefits. Specifically, it would
have hurt the businesses which competed with the international businesses subject to worldwide unitary
taxation. As noted above, public choice scholarship predicts that legislators will tend to avoid legislating if a policy imposes concentrated costs.
337. But see supra note 336.
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local taxation and sales and use taxation appears reasonably consistent with that scholarship. Most of that legislation provided relatively concentrated costs and benefits.
Specifically, the bills prohibiting state and local head taxes on airline passengers benefitted both the airlines and the airline passengers while they imposed costs on airports.
The early bills regulating sales and use taxation benefitted interstate mail order sellers
and imposed costs on their competitors while the later bills benefitted the mail order
sellers' intrastate competitors and imposed costs on the interstate mail order sellers.
The bills regulating multiple areas of state and local taxation benefitted interstate businesses by imposing uniform limits on when states could tax the income or gross receipts of businesses engaged in interstate commerce and limiting the percentage of
multistate business income or capital that states could tax. The bills imposed costs on
the intrastate competitors of the interstate businesses by granting the interstate businesses a competitive tax advantage vis-a-vis the intrastate businesses.33 s Congress enacted the prohibition on state and local head taxes on airline passengers as part of a
much larger legislative package, and that legislation represented a series of compromises. In fact, Senate Report 93-12 expressly states:
[T]he Committee views S. 38 as an aviation development package-the components
of which can not be separated. We believe that if the prohibition on local head taxes was not part of the total new program, there would be need to re-evaluate the
increased Federal funding for airport development projects called for in S. 38. If local taxes on passengers and air carriers are allowed to proliferate nationally and are
to become a major factor in the financing of local airport facilities, then there is
obviously less need for a Federal airport development program. If local head taxes
become a significant airport funding mechanism the public interest may well require a reduction in Federal user taxes and diminution of Federal participation in
airport development projects.339
In contrast, the interested parties were never able to reach a compromise with respect
to the bills regulating multiple areas of state and local taxation and sales and use taxation, and thus no such legislation was enacted.'

338. Of course, all of the bills also imposed costs on the states by limiting their ability to tax.
Whether that is viewed as a concentrated or diffuse cost depends on whether states are viewed as a
separate entity. See generally supra note 325 and accompanying text.
339. S. REP. No. 93-12, at 1455 (1975). Public Law 105-95 also involved a compromise on the
breadth of coverage. Although the first bills introduced on the subject did not define the term "pension
income," by the 1995 hearing on the subject, the testimony focused primarily on the definition of that
term. Compare, e.g., S. 2820, 100th Cong. (1988); H.R. 5276, 100th Cong. (1988); S. 434, 101st
Cong. (1989) with 1995 Pension Hearing, supra note 92. See also Harriet Hanlon, The Federal Source
Tax Law: Gauging the Impact, 10 ST. TAX NoTEs 880, 881 (1996) ("Lynn Dudley, vice president of
retirement policy with the Association of Private Pensions and Welfare Plans, said the new federal law
is a good one and represents a compromise between businesses and the states. The real compromises
were made over what constituted a nonqualified plan.").
340. See generally, S. 2173 Hearing, supra note 227, at 39, 99-100 (1977 & 1978) (Steven
Mannear, La. Dep't of Revenue, expressly acknowledges that a compromise is required for effective
legislation; Senator Mathias declares, "The reason we've been at this so long is because until now the
gap between what state and local governments could tolerate and what the businesses could live with
in an interstate tax reform bill seemed to be unbridgeable."); 1973 State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Hearing, supra note 230, at 1 (In opening the subcommittee hearings, Senator Mondale counsels, "the reason for the failure of Congress to act, among other things, has been the almost total lack
of agreement among the interested parties ....
If, therefore, the subcommittee's hearings are to be
productive, and if these hearings are to lead to a legislative proposal, there should, if possible, be
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Overall, the empirical evidence appears reasonably consistent with the public
choice theory of legislation. As public choice theory would predict, Congress has enacted legislation in the state and local tax area when such legislation favors cohesive
special interest groups and has tended to avoid legislating when legislation would offer
diffuse benefits and diffuse costs. Of course, the empirical evidence has not been entirely consistent with public choice theory. For example, Congress has enacted legislation that could harm the legislators' chance of reelection, contrary to at least some
public choice scholarship.
V. CONCLUSION
Although few outside academia dispute that we need more uniformity in state
and local taxation, it does not appear that Congress is likely to enact legislation mandating more uniformity in state and local taxation in the near future. An empirical
study of congressional activity in the state and local tax area suggests that Congress is
unlikely to enact legislation mandating more uniformity unless and until states and
taxpayers are willing and able to reach a compromise and that such a compromise is
unlikely to occur in the near future. Moreover, this empirical evidence is fairly consistent with the public choice theory of legislation which offers little hope that Congress
will soon enact legislation mandating more uniformity in state and local taxation.
All, however, is not lost. Relational feminist theory offers some hope that legislation providing for more uniformity in state and local taxation may ultimately be
enacted. Relational feminist theory34' teaches that men and women tend to be profoundly different in their outlook and approach to problems. Men tend to be individualistic and address problems with the "logic of the ladder." They apply abstracted,
universalistic principles to problematic situations to create an "ethic of justice." Women, in contrast, tend to be more relational, focus on the "web," and follow an "ethic of
care." Their reasoning tends to be grounded in a relational, connected, contextual form
that focuses on people as well as problems. 42
Relationalist feminist theory thus suggests that as women gain power, the female
"ethic of care" should gain ascendancy and political decisionmaking should become
less self-interested. 3 Accordingly, the theory offers the hope that if someday women
gain sufficient power for the ethic of care to balance the ethic of justice, state and

agreement among the interested parties on the principal points of that proposal.").
341. Relational feminist theory is "one of the most prominent and widely accepted varieties of
feminist and feminist legal thought" Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational
Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 858, 858 (1993). It is not,
however, without its critics. See, e.g., id.; CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DisCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 38-39 (1987); Joan Wiliams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REv.
797, 802-22 (1989).
342. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics,
2 VA. J. SOC. POI'Y & L. 75, 75-80 (1994). See also CAROL GI.UGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEvELOPMENT (1982); Martha Schweitz, Of Webs and Ladders: Gender Equality in Baha'i Law, 27 WORLD ORDER 21 (1995); Robin West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1988).
343. Cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process," 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW J. 39, 60-61 (1985) (asking whether the substance of our
law would change if women, using the "ethic of care," became decision makers.). See also Kenneth
Karst, Women's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L. J. 447 (1984) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution should
be reconstructed in light of "web of connection").
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taxpayer representatives may become sufficiently concerned with the greater good to
reach the compromises necessary for legislation providing for more uniformity in state
and local taxation.' As Suzanne Lebsock has said, "as women come to power[,
chances are] a more humane social order will indeed come with them."3 "

344. Such legislation may take the form of federal legislation mandating more uniformity in state
and local taxation or of voluntary cooperation among the states in enacting uniform legislation.
345. SUzANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WoMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN 144 (1984). See also 'ABDU'L-BAHA, THE PROMULGATION OF UNIVERSAL PEACE: TALKS
DELIVERED BY 'ABDU'L-BAHA

DURING HIs Visrr TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN 1912 182

(2d ed. 1982) ("The world of humanity has two wings-one is women and the other men. Not until
both wings are equally developed can the bird fly. Should one wing remain weak, flight is impossible.").

